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Abstract 
Protecting DoD critical infrastructure resources and Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems from cyber attacks is becoming an increasingly 
challenging task.  DoD Information Assurance controls provide a sound framework to 
achieve an appropriate level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. However, these 
controls have not been updated since 2003 and currently do not adequately address the 
security of DoD SCADA systems. This research sampled U.S. Air Force Civil 
Engineering subject matter experts representing eight Major Commands that manage and 
operate SCADA systems. They ranked 30 IA controls in three categories, and evaluated 
eight SCADA specific IA controls for inclusion into the DoD IA control framework. 
Spearman’s Rho ranking results (ρ = .972414) indicate a high preference for encryption, 
and system and information integrity as key IA Controls to mitigate cyber risk. Equally 
interesting was the strong agreement among raters on ranking certification and 
accreditation dead last as an effective IA control. The respondents strongly favored 
including four new IA controls of the eight considered. 
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CODIFYING INFORMATION ASSURANCE CONTROLS FOR DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE (DOD) SUPERVISORY CONTROL AND DATA ACQUISITION 
(SCADA) SYSTEMS 
 
I. Introduction 
The evolution of critical infrastructure has experienced an unusually rapid maturity in 
the last decade due to the high influence of information technology and the Internet. 
Twenty years ago, “infrastructure” was defined primarily with respect to the adequacy of 
the nation’s public works (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).  Recent threat developments 
have culminated in a series of laws, and executive orders to define infrastructure sectors 
and the corresponding assets considered being to be the most “critical”.  Vulnerability of 
these systems to cyber interruptions (intentional or unintentional) or exploitation due to 
internet connectivity has raised the level of information systems importance to critical 
infrastructure. 
Information systems can add value to Industrial Control System (ICS) environments.  
Consequently, the number of information systems used in ICS has increased rapidly in 
recent years (Guttromson & Schur, 2007).  ICSs are of critical importance to our nation 
as many are used to support a significant number of the national critical infrastructure.  
Besides adding value, the convergence of information systems and ICSs also threaten our 
nation by putting at risk our national critical infrastructure. (Throughout this thesis, 
Industrial Control Systems will be referred to as Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems for consistency and clarity).   
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Information security specialists have to artfully balance security versus operation.  It 
is part of their job to allow enough flexibility for successful operations while protecting 
the systems and the data therein.  Security professionals agree that SCADA systems are 
generally more complicated because of the convergence of increasingly dissimilar 
technologies in SCADA systems and business networks.  As long as corporations 
continue to connect SCADA systems with business enterprise networks, the potential 
risks for cyber attacks will continue to increase (Ning, 2008).     
This research focused on the current Department of Defense (DoD) Information 
Assurance (IA) controls published in 2003 and the current NIST ICS Security controls 
published in 2008.  This thesis seeks to correlate the current set of IA controls framework 
to determine IA security control gaps specific to SCADA systems.  
Problem Statement 
Protecting our critical infrastructures from attack is a very difficult task.  The 
government not only considers a vast number of infrastructure critical, but the fact that up 
to 85% of our critical infrastructure is owned by the private sector makes the problem 
even more challenging (Martin, 2006).  Understanding the importance of ICSs, associated 
cyber risk, and how they are protected via IA controls is considered highly relevant for 
this effort.  The adoption of information technology systems in an ICS environment and 
their convergence continue to increase our nation’s exposure to real and potentially 
catastrophic threats (GAO, 2004).    
This research seeks to reduce the gap between security IA controls issued by DoD 
in 2003 and the current NIST ICS security controls published in 2008.  Much has 
changed since 2003.  There are currently a vast number of organizations engaged in 
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various research efforts focused on SCADA and ICS security.  The most recent DoD IA 
controls published in 2003 do not incorporate the new ICS IA controls published by 
NIST in 2008.  This thesis attempts to generate ICS security controls corresponding to 
NIST publications and update the DoD IA controls, thus, producing a standard that can 
be applied to AF ICS.  
Research Goals 
The overall AFIT AF A4/7 research effort is to develop efficient methodologies for 
assessing AF critical infrastructures.  For this phase of the effort, this thesis will review 
and correlate current National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and 
Department of Defense (DoD) security controls, identify possible DoD Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) security gaps, recommend new or modified DoD IA controls to close these 
gaps and validate security controls with subject matter experts from the AF civil 
engineering community. Finally, this thesis will assess what security controls the DoD 
ICS community believes are the most important. 
Scope 
 This research is limited to mostly non-technical assessments of current 
government and Department of Defense (DoD) published standards, policy or regulation 
and the opinion of different subject matter experts from the AF civil engineering 
community.   
Thesis Organization 
The goal of this section is to provide a background for this research, establish its 
goals and scope and introduce the organization of this thesis.  In order to discover 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) security gaps in DoD Information Assurance (IA) 
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security controls, one must understand the importance of ICS and information assurance.  
Chapter two provides the background of Industrial Controls Systems (ICS) and their 
importance to critical infrastructure.  Next, SCADA and Information Systems (IS) 
network convergence, cyber connectivity trends, and critical infrastructure cyber 
exposures are discussed.  The next section discusses the basics of protecting Information 
IS in the federal government and the DoD via IA disciplines.  Chapter two concludes by 
bringing together IA security controls from the National Institute of Standard and 
Technology (NIST) and the DoD specific to SCADA systems.  Chapter three present the 
methodology used in the study data collection procedures, and survey instrument, and the 
data analysis procedures.  Chapter four presents the results of the data analysis.  Chapter 
five discusses the conclusions and recommendations for future research. 
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II. Literature Review 
Overview 
This section covers, in very general terms, topics such as Industrial Control Systems 
(called SCADA throughout this document), Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
Information Assurance, Information Assurance Controls and the role different levels of 
our government play in attempting to protect their information assets.  Equally important 
to the discussion is the importance of SCADA systems as they have become integral parts 
of our critical infrastructure and how different government agencies attempt to preserve 
their confidentiality, integrity and availability through the use of information assurance 
programs and IA controls.  This section provides a high-level view of the government’s 
SCADA IA effort and ends with a brief view of DoD specific efforts.  
 The U.S. has seen a significant and steady increase in cyber attacks on both 
traditional information technology (IT) networks and Critical Infrastructure Systems.  
Some of these information systems are at the core of our national critical infrastructure; 
hence greater efforts and attention are being directed towards securing these systems and 
cyber security has become a priority to our nation (Langevin & McCaul, 2008). 
Not only is the government taking notice, but the mainstream media is now covering 
cyber security in much more detail.  In the article “America’s Growing Risk:  Cyber 
Attack.  How enemy hackers threaten our nuke plants, pipelines and more,” (Derene, 
2009) discusses the possibilities of the enemy creating mass disruptions of services to 
SCADA by changing a few lines of computer code (Derene, 2009).  These scenarios 
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become more plausible as more organizations continue to integrate SCADA and business 
networks leading to an increased risk of cyber attacks.   
Critical Infrastructure 
The definition of critical infrastructure is constantly evolving (Lewis, 2006).  The 
Marsh Report (1997) and Executive Order 13010 (EO-13010, 1998) provided an early 
definition of infrastructure: 
 “a network of independent, mostly privately-owned, man-made systems that function 
collaboratively and synergistically to produce and distribute a continuous flow of 
essential foods and service” (Lewis, 2006). 
The most current definition can be found in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7, issued by President Bush in 2003:    
“Critical infrastructure and key resources provide the essential services that 
underpin American society.  The Nation possesses numerous key resources, whose 
exploitation or destruction by terrorists could cause catastrophic health effects or mass 
casualties comparable to those from the use of a weapon of mass destruction, or could 
profoundly affect our national prestige and morale.  In addition, there is critical 
infrastructure so vital that its incapacitation, exploitation, or destruction, through 
terrorist attack, could have a debilitating effect on security and economic well-being” 
(Moteff &Parfomak, 2004). 
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Table 1. Critical infrastructure sectors (Brown et al.,  2006) 
Critical infrastructure sectors 
Information Technology Public health, healthcare and food 
Telecommunications -  Drinking water and water treatment  
Chemical Energy 
Transportation Systems Banking and finance 
Emergency Services National monuments and icons 
Postal and Shipping services Defense industrial base  
Agriculture  
 
Critical infrastructure is divided into 14 sectors, the sectors are provided in Table 1.  
These infrastructures have grown complex and interconnected, meaning that a disruption 
in one may lead to disruptions in others (Mosfett, 2008).   Over the years, operators of 
these infrastructures have taken measures to guard against, and to quickly respond to, 
many of the intentional and unintentional threats (Mosfett, 2008).  However, the 
protection of these sectors requires government agencies and the private sector to work in 
concert to try to find the best solutions for protecting our critical infrastructures.  To best 
coordinate efforts and resources, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7 selected 
eight agencies for each of the sectors.  Table 2 provides a list of lead agencies and their 
corresponding responsibility for critical infrastructure. 
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Table 2. Critical Infrastructure Lead Agencies (Moteff &Parfomak, 2004) 
Lead Agency Critical Infrastructure 
Dept. of Homeland Security Information technology 
Telecommunications 
Chemical 
Transportation systems, including mass transit, aviation, 
maritime, ground/surface, and rail and pipeline systems 
Emergency services 
Postal and shipping services 
Dept. of Agriculture Agriculture, food (meat, poultry, egg products) 
Dept. of Health and Human 
Services 
Public health, healthcare, and food (other than meat, 
poultry, egg products) 
Environmental Protection 
Agency 
Drinking water and waste water treatment systems 
Dept. of Energy Energy, including the production refining, storage, and 
distribution of oil and gas, and electric power (except for 
commercial nuclear power facilities) 
Dept. of the Treasury Banking and finance 
Dept. of the Interior National monuments and icons 
Dept. of Defense Defense industrial base 
 
 
Industrial Control Systems support a great number of our critical national 
infrastructures such as power generation, gas and oil pipelines, water and waste, etc.  The 
number of information systems in critical infrastructures has increased rapidly in recent 
years (Guttromson & Schur, 2007).  Information systems expansion and adoption by 
critical infrastructure operators can threaten our nation by putting our national critical 
infrastructure at risk.  
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) 
In this thesis, the terms Industrial Control Systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA), and Critical Infrastructure are generally used 
interchangeably to refer to the same systems.  This thesis uses SCADA as a general term 
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encompassing several types of controls systems including ICS, distribute control systems 
(DCS), and critical infrastructure systems. 
SCADA systems are considered a specialized information system.  However, unlike a 
“regular” information system, SCADA systems have been primarily designed with safety, 
availability, and reliability in mind.  SCADA systems are a type of computer automation 
system that uses a central computer system, wide area communications technologies and 
a large number of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), to monitor and control geographically 
distributed processes such as pipelines, electric power transmission, and waste water 
(Shaw, 2006).  
Because SCADA systems are based on computer technology, their designs have 
evolved in step with advances in computer technology which means that as computer 
technology has developed, the designers of SCADA systems have incorporated these 
advances into these systems (Shaw, 2006).  In addition, SCADA systems can be viewed 
as a system of systems where individual components contribute to the overall availability, 
integrity, and confidentiality of the entire system.  The loss of a single component can 
bring down the entire system.  This philosophy is embraced by the popular saying: “A 
system is only as strong as its weakest link.” 
A SCADA system is basically used to fetch and present current data values to human 
operators typically located at a control center (Shaw, 2006).  The control centers are 
usually located in a separate physical part of the factory and typically have advanced 
computation and communication facilities.  Modern control centers have data servers, 
human-machine interface (HMI) stations, data historians, engineering workstations, and 
other servers to aid the operators in the overall management of the SCADA system (see 
 
 
10 
 
Figure 1).  Control centers provides situational awareness of the systems and operations, 
dispatch repair crews when needed, and serve as the focal point during emergencies 
(Igure, 2008).   
 
Figure 1. Typical Components of Industrial Control Systems (GAO, 2004) 
SCADA networks are usually connected to the outside corporate network and/or the 
internet through specialized gateways (Igure, 2008).  A SCADA network provides 
various connections for field devices or remote field sites via telephone, radio frequency 
(RF), satellite or wide area networks (see Figure 2.).  These field devices, such as sensors 
and actuators, are monitored and controlled over the SCADA network at the control 
center.  Communications on a SCADA network include control messages exchanged 
between master and slave devices.  A master device is one which can control the 
operation of another device (i.e. PC, PLC).  A slave device is usually a simple sensor or 
actuator which can send messages to the command device and carry out actions at the 
command of a master device (Igure, 2008). 
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Figure 2.  SCADA Control Center (Stouffer, 2005) 
Many of these systems perform critical functions.  In the electric industry for 
example, many of these systems perform critical bulk electric systems functions such as 
telemetry, monitoring and control, power plant control and real-time inter-utility data 
exchange.  The loss or compromise of these systems would adversely impact the reliable 
operation of electric system assets, affecting part of our nation’s critical infrastructure 
(Shaw, 2006). 
 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)   
There has been a variety of working groups, special reports, federal policies, and 
organizations addressing CIP issues (see Appendix A for evolution of CIP) (GAO, 2004).   
In recent years, the security community has grown more concerned about the physical 
and cyber vulnerability of critical infrastructures (Moteff, 2008).  We know with certainty 
that in order to protect our national critical infrastructure against possible attacks, security 
specialists have to properly guard against physical and cyber threats alike.   
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The government’s goal for CIP is to ensure that any disruptions of the services 
provided by critical infrastructures are infrequent, of minimal duration, and manageable 
(Moteff, 2008).  CIP tries to counter and mitigate existing critical infrastructures threats.  
The official definition of CIP as defined in Presidential Directive 7 is: “the strategies, 
policies and preparedness needed to protect, prevent, and when necessary, respond to 
attacks on critical sectors and key assets” (Lewis, 2006).    
Because about 85 percent of the nation’s critical infrastructure is owned by the 
private sector, it is vital that the public and private sectors work together to protect these 
assets.  To this effect, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for 
coordinating a national protection strategy including formation of government and private 
sector councils as a collaborating tool. The councils are to identify their most critical 
assets, assess the risks they face, and identify protective measures in sector-specific plans 
that comply with DHS’s National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) (GAO, 2006). 
In a press release (Nov 2009), Secretary Napolitano reaffirmed the government 
commitment to protecting our critical infrastructures: 
 “Securing our nation’s critical infrastructure is vital to maintaining the safety of 
communities across the country; DHS is committed to working with federal, state, local, 
territorial and tribal partners, the private sector and the public to protect against threats to 
these assets—from cyber networks to drinking water.” 
Many of these critical infrastructure sectors have developed their own security 
practices and procedures.  Many of these practices and procedures are applicable across 
industry boundaries to include the federal government.  NIST has been working with a 
vast number of organizations to collect and codify this information to develop security 
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control standards that can be tailored and applied across sectors.  This unified security 
framework is crucial to protect our critical infrastructures, especially in the cyberspace 
domain. 
Critical Infrastructure and Cyberspace 
Globally-interconnected digital information and communications infrastructure 
underpins almost every facet of modern society and provides critical support for the U.S. 
economy, civil infrastructure, public safety, and national security (Hathaway, 2009).  
Most modern industrial facilities (e.g. oil refineries, chemical factories, electrical power 
generation, and manufacturing) and associated critical infrastructures are largely 
dependent on these digital information and communications infrastructure.   
The new Cyberspace Policy Review (2009) defines cyberspace as “… the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and includes the 
Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers in critical industries. Common usage of the term also refers to the virtual 
environment of information and interactions between people.”   
Operators rely heavily on cyberspace to monitor and control industrial systems.  
Because these networks are connected to the business network and the internet, operators 
are able to remote command and control these systems (Igure, 2008).  This connectivity 
can help optimize manufacturing and distribution processes.  It can also increase 
efficiency and reduce costs, but it also exposes the safety-critical industrial network to the 
myriad security problems of the internet (Igure, 2008). 
Historically, security concerns were about protecting the physical nodes against 
physical attack, not protecting SCADA systems in cyberspace.  This is no longer the 
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case; it has become evident that critical infrastructures are also vulnerable to cyber 
attacks (Dancey, 2004).  Several factors have contributed to the higher number of cyber 
threats to these systems:  (1) the adoption of standardized technologies with known 
vulnerabilities, (2) the connectivity of control systems to other networks, (3) insecure 
remote connections, and (4) the widespread availability of technical information about 
control systems (Dancey, 2004).   
Since 2001, 70% of reported incidents were due to attacks originating from outside 
the SCADA network (Igure, 2008).  In a recent report published by the security company 
McAffe (2010), six hundred IT and security executives from critical infrastructure 
enterprises across seven sectors in 14 countries were surveyed.  Topics of the survey 
included:  their practices, attitudes and policies on security, the impact of regulation, their 
relationship with government, specific security measures employed on their networks, 
and the kinds of attacks they face (Baker et al., 2010).  According to Baker et al (2010), 
the survey was not designed to be statistically valid.  However, it provides a snapshot of 
views from a significant group of decision-makers.  Additionally, the survey described in 
detail the way critical IT networks are defended and secured today. 
  Some of the more significant details provided in the report are: 
• China reported the highest adoption rate of security measures  
• Sectors with lowest adoption rate of security measures are water and sewage 
• Sectors with highest adoption rate of security measures are energy and 
banking 
• Foreign governments involvement in recent critical infrastructure attacks is 
high 
• US and China are seen as “most potential” aggressors to critical infrastructure 
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Figure 3. Time Base Expectancy of a Cyber Attack (Baker et al., 2010) 
Countries expect critical infrastructure attacks in the near future.  Figure 3 provides a 
bar graph illustrating which countries expect a critical infrastructure attack.  These 
attacks are often leveraged by highly skilled operators and sponsored by foreign nations 
(Baker et al., 2010).  The impact can vary depending on the severity of the attack and/or 
the facility targeted.   Attacks can cost millions of dollars in lost revenues and damaged 
reputation.  Survey participants also believe that attackers will become more skilled and 
resourceful (Baker et al., 2010). 
The same sentiment was echoed by Mr. Dennis C. Blair, Director of National 
Intelligence during his 2010 annual threat assessment brief to Congress while speaking 
on the subject of cyber threats: 
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“The national security of the United States, our economic prosperity, and the 
daily functioning of our government are dependent on a dynamic public and 
private information infrastructure, which includes telecommunications, computer 
networks and systems, and the information residing within. This critical 
infrastructure is severely threatened…The United States confronts a dangerous 
combination of known and unknown vulnerabilities, strong and rapidly expanding 
adversary capabilities, and a lack of comprehensive threat awareness. Malicious 
cyber activity is occurring on an unprecedented scale with extraordinary 
sophistication.” 
 
Information Assurance (IA) 
What is information assurance?  It is about protecting information from destruction, 
degradation, manipulation and exploitation (Blyth and Kovacich, 2006).  Information 
assurance has many different meanings to many different people but a widely used 
definition for IA in the private sector is: 
“ IA defines and applies a collection of policies, standards, methodologies, services 
and mechanisms to maintain mission integrity with respect to people, process, 
technology, information and supporting infrastructure” (Willett, 2008).  
Information has become a critical asset and a high value target for many competing 
interests.  Therefore, information and information systems need to be protected and 
secured from unauthorized access, changes or disruptions. Information assurance 
provides a mean for an organization to protect their information and information systems.  
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As society increasingly relies on information systems, an effective IA program must 
be implemented that addresses technology, processes, and people.  A failure of any one 
of these elements can adversely impact the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of 
systems and the information within.  An effective IA program becomes more crucial as 
cyber attackers continue to improve their technical competencies, tactics, and techniques.   
 
The DoD defines IA as: 
 “Actions taken that protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-repudiation.  
This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating 
protection, detection and reaction capabilities”(DoDD 8500.1, 2002). 
IA and the US Government 
Technology advancements have improved many aspects of our lives but they have 
also given rise to various new problems (Senft and Gallegos, 2008).  The government is 
coping with these new problems by trying to update laws, policy and regulations. 
Unfortunately, they generally lag behind new technological changes.  Even when 
governments assume the role of defender, seeking to prevent attacks and improve 
security, many IT and security executives are skeptical about their ability to deter or 
protect against cyber attacks.  Figure 4 compares the percentage of countries that believe 
their current laws are inadequate against cyber attackers. 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
Figure 4. Laws Inadequate Against Cyber Attacks (Baker et al., 2010) 
Reaction to serious events can be a great catalyst for quick government action.  For 
example, major data breaches caused by hackers and stolen or lost laptops resulted in 
huge outcries by citizens prompting the government to enact new laws, policies and 
guidance (refer to Appendix C for a more comprehensive breakdown of some of these 
documents).  For this research effort, the focus is directed toward documents related to 
the development of IA programs and security controls such as Appendix III to Office of 
Management and Budget Circular Number A-130 (OMB Circular No. A-130), and the 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). 
OMB Circular No. A-130 in many ways engendered the need to establish and employ 
IA controls commensurate to information risk and affirmed the need to accredit and 
certify federal systems at least every three years (OMB, 2000).  Appendix III re-orients 
the federal computer security program to better respond to a rapidly changing 
technological environment.  It establishes government wide responsibilities for federal 
 
 
19 
 
computer security and requires federal agencies to adopt a minimum set of management 
controls.  
These management controls are directed at individual information technology users.  
Agencies are required to implement and maintain a program to assure that adequate 
security is provided for all agency information collected, processed, transmitted, stored, 
or disseminated in general support systems and major applications (OMB, 2000). In 
addition, agencies need to review the security controls in each system when significant 
modifications are made to the system, but at least every three years. The scope and 
frequency of the review should be commensurate with the acceptable level of risk for the 
system (OMB, 2000). 
FISMA is the principal law governing the federal government’s information security 
program.  It requires federal government agencies to provide information security 
protections for agency information and information systems (Hulitt and Vaughn Jr, 
2008).  FISMA defined three security objectives for federal government information 
systems: (1) confidentiality, to preserve authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, 
with means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; (2) integrity, to 
guard against improper information modification or destruction while ensuring 
information non-repudiation and authenticity; and (3) availability, to ensure timely and 
reliable access and use of information.  FISMA places significant requirements on federal 
agencies for the protection of information and information systems, and places significant 
requirements on the NIST to assist the federal agencies comply with FISMA (Ross et al., 
2005).   
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FISMA required NIST to develop two mandatory Federal Information Processing 
Standards (FIPS) that apply to all federal information and information systems to include 
SCADA systems.  However, these FIPS are not mandatory for the national security 
community and private sector.  These standards are FIPS 199 and FIPS 200.  FIPS 199 is 
a standard used for determining the security category of an information system.  FIPS 
200 is a standard stating the mandatory minimum security requirements that all federal 
information systems must meet (Katzke, Stouffer et al., 2006).  
IA and the DoD 
DoD policy mandates IA to be implemented in all systems and services acquisitions 
at levels appropriate to the system characteristics and requirements throughout the entire 
system life cycle (DoDI 8580.1, 2004).  One of the key processes for implementing 
information assurance is the Certification and Accreditation (C&A) process.    
DoDD 8500.1 requires that all DoD information systems be certified and accredited.   
Certification is defined as:  “The comprehensive evaluation of the technical and non-
technical security features of an IT system and other safeguards, made in support of the 
accreditation process, to establish the extent that a particular design and implementation 
meets a set of specified security requirements” (Lee et al., 2005).   
Accreditation on the other hand is “The formal declaration by the Designated 
Approving Authority (DAA) that an IT system is approved to operate in a particular 
security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards at an acceptable level of risk” (Lee, 
S., G. Ahn, et al., 2005).  The DAA is “The official with the authority to formally assume 
the responsibility for operating a system or network at an acceptable level of risk” (Lee 
et al., 2005).  
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The DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process 
(DITSCAP) was one of the first processes to certify and accredit DoD systems.  The 
DITSCAP Application Manual defines the DITSCAP as “the standard DoD process for 
identifying information security requirements, providing security solutions, and 
managing information systems security activities” (Lee et al., 2005).  In 2006, the 
DITSCAP was superseded by the DoD Information Assurance Certification and 
Accreditation Process (DIACAP).  DIACAP officially establishes DoD’s IA C&A 
process for authorizing the operation of DoD information systems. DIACAP is the DoD’s 
approach to implementing a C&A process that supports Net-Centricity (Tyler, 2006).   
The DoD anticipates that almost everything will eventually interconnect making the 
standardization of protection levels for systems very important.  This implies that there 
should be a standard for determining a protection level to enable uniformity across 
interconnections (Campbell, 2007).  Table 2 provides a variety of C & A guiding 
documents for federal organizations. 
Table 3. C& A Guiding Documents (Campbell, 2007) 
Federal Entity Guiding Document 
DoD 
DIACAP, DoDD 8500.1, DoDI 8500.2 &  
DoDI 8510.01 
Intelligence DCID 6/3 
Other Federal Agencies 
OMB A-130, NIST SP 800-37, NIST SP 800-
53, NIST SP 800-60 
 
 
The DIACAP implements and validates standardized IA controls across DoD 
information systems consistent with DoD regulatory policy (i.e. IA 8500 series) and 
legislative policy (i.e. FISMA) (Bendel, 2006). In addition, DIACAP is based on two 
principles:  (1) IA is established via IA controls
maintained.   
The concepts of DoD IA controls were introduced
DoDI 8500.2.  An IA control describes what the relevant safeguards and activities should 
provide  (Campbell, 2007). All 
level of confidentiality, integrity, authentication, 
Figure 
Due to the sheer number of systems and to make the program more manageable for 
IA professionals, DoD information systems are organized into the four categories
Automated Information System
processes, and platform IT (DoD
of the four categories.  Appendix 
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, and (2) IA controls need to be 
 in 2002 by DoDD 8500.1 and 
DoD information systems have to maintain an appropriate 
availability, and non-repudiation.  
 
5.  IS IA Categories (from Auburn.edu) 
 (AIS) applications, enclaves, outsourced IT-
I 8500.2, 2003). Figure 5 offers a logical representation 
D contains definitions for each of these categories
 
 
: 
based 
. 
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 Due to the “joint” nature of military operations and to continue to move towards 
DoD’s net-centricity vision, the DoD has decided that a service C&A should be honored 
when connecting to a different service’s network via a reciprocity agreement.  DoD 
Memorandum (2009), DoD Information System Certification and Accreditation 
Reciprocity, “mandates the mutual agreement among participating enterprises to accept 
each other’s security assessment in order to reuse IS resources and /or accept each 
other’s assessed security posture in order to share information.” 
IA and ICS 
Many SCADA systems in use today entered the workforce years ago, when security 
measures were not anticipated; system reliability and safety were primarily the focus.  
Securing SCADA systems simply meant: physically secure access to the network and the 
devices that controlled these systems (Katzke et al., 2006).  The introduction of new 
information technologies makes it possible to connect vastly different networks -- to 
include the once isolated SCADA networks.  SCADA networks are now able to connect 
to traditional business networks over the same information infrastructure.   
A common misconception regarding SCADA networks is that they are isolated from 
outside networks (Igure, 2008).  However, according to the McAffe report (2010), “more 
than three quarters of those with responsibilities for ICS reported that they were 
connected to the Internet or some other IP network, and just under half of those 
connected admitted that this created an “unresolved security issue.”  Business networks 
are perhaps better equipped to handle insecurities and have security tools designed to 
counter and mitigate threats, but many ICS components are unprepared to handle most 
common threats and malware (Wiles et al., 2008).  
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Neglecting or bypassing security measures can create a vast number of vulnerabilities 
Figure 6 illustrate the security measures adoption rates by country.  Security 
vulnerabilities can also arise in a system because of problems in the system specification, 
the system implementation or during system operation (Igure, 2008).  Attackers take 
advantage of these vulnerabilities to affect the integrity, availability, and confidentiality 
of these systems.  Table 3 describes the most common general threats and effects of 
several of these attacks. 
 
Figure 6. Security measures adoption rates (Baker et al., 2010) 
The connectivity of SCADA networks with outside networks will continue to grow, 
leading to an increased risk of cyber attacks and a critical need to improve the security of 
SCADA networks (Igure, 2008).  Many professional organizations are involved in the 
effort to improve SCADA network security (Igure, 2008).  Many industry sectors have 
developed their own security standards, for example:  the electric industry uses North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) standards, the gas industry uses the 
American Gas Association (AGA) standards.   
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Table 4.  General threats and attack effects (Igure, 2008) 
General Threat Effect of Attack 
Modifying system/user data Loss of data integrity;  Secondary effects could be loss of 
availability 
Alter/Destroy stored data Loss of data 
Modify message content 
Change control signals 
Change data points/set points 
Change operator display value 
Loss of data/message integrity; Secondary effects could be 
loss of availability; Presenting wrong information to 
human operators could have adverse effects 
Sniffing data/control messages Loss of confidentiality 
Block/reroute communications Loss of availability 
Shut down devices Loss of availability 
Plan malicious code Could cause all kinds of disruptions depending on intent 
of attack 
 
 
US Government and ICS IA  
The major US government SCADA security objectives are:  (1) restrict logical access 
to the SCADA network, (2) restrict physical access to the SCADA network and devices, 
(3) protect individual SCADA components from exploitation, (4) maintain functionality 
during adverse conditions, and (5) restoring systems after an incident (SP 800-82, 2008).  
The government believes that the most successful methods for securing a SCADA system 
is to gather industry recommended practices and engage in a proactive, collaborative 
effort between all stake holders (SP 800-53, 2009). 
As previously mentioned, FISMA required NIST to develop two mandatory Federal 
Information Processing Standards (FIPS).  To support both FIPS 199 and FIPS 200, 
NIST developed Special Publication (SP) 800-53, “Recommended Security Controls for 
Federal Information Systems.”  SP 800-53 requires federal agencies to implement one of 
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three minimum (baseline) sets of security controls for all information system in the 
agency based on the systems’ security categorization (2006). 
It is important to point out that SP 800-53 was first developed to address traditional 
IT systems, not SCADA systems.  In time, SP 800-53 has adopted security controls 
specific to ICS.  NIST has worked cooperatively with the SCADA communities in the 
public and private sectors to develop specific guidance to apply the security controls 
SCADA systems.  SCADA-specific guidance is included in NIST SP 800-53, Revision 3, 
Appendix I: Industrial Control Systems – Security Controls, Enhancements, and 
Supplemental Guidance (Stouffer et al., 2008).  
If automated mechanisms are not readily available, cost-effective or technically 
feasible, then compensating security controls implemented through non-automated 
mechanisms or procedures should be employed (SP 800-53, 2009).   Compensating 
controls are alternative safeguards and countermeasures that accomplish the intent of the 
original security controls that could not be effectively employed (SP 800-53, 2009).    
In 2006, NIST released the Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 
(SCADA) and Industrial Control System Security (SP 800-82) to addresses 
vulnerabilities, threats, and security controls (Katzke et al., 2006).  Section 6 of the 
document provides initial guidance on how 800-53 security controls apply to ICS’s.  See 
Appendix D for a list of ICS specific controls (Stouffer et al., 2008).  Following the NIST 
guidelines is mandatory for federal agencies; however, it is voluntary for 
nongovernmental organizations and private agencies.   
NIST SP 800-82 provides an overview of ICS’s system topologies, identifies threats 
and vulnerabilities to an ICS, and provides recommended security countermeasures to 
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mitigate the associated risks. Specific recommendations and guidance are provided in an 
outlined box for each section throughout the document. In addition, Appendix C provides 
an overview of the many activities currently ongoing among federal organizations, 
standards organizations, industry groups, and automation system vendors to make 
available “best practices” in the area of ICS security (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
Organizations are encouraged to tailor the recommended guidelines and solutions to 
meet their specific security and business requirements (Stouffer et al., 2008).  A single 
security solution is not adequate to properly protect ICS’s.  An effective cyber security 
strategy should apply a defense-in-depth approach.  A combination of policy and security 
controls can be very effective.  The publication provides three types of security controls:  
management, operational and technical (Stouffer et al., 2008). 
NIST IA Controls 
NIST security controls are derived from multiple communities (defense, financial, 
healthcare, and intelligence) and are applicable to any organization (SP800-53, 2009).  
The selection and implementation of appropriate security controls for information 
systems are important tasks that can have major implications on the operations and assets 
of an organization (SP800-53, 2009).  To successfully implement security controls, 
organizations must (1) select a security control baseline, (2) tailor the baseline security 
controls, and (3) supplement the tailored baseline as necessary. 
Table 4 provides a listing of the NIST SP 800-53 security controls.  They are grouped 
into three classes (1) management, (2) operational, and (3) technical controls. Security 
controls should be employed in conjunction with and as part of a well-defined and 
documented information security program (SP800-53, 2009). 
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Table 5. SP 800-53 Security Control (SP800-53, 2009) 
ID FAMILY CLASS 
AC Access Control Technical 
AT Awareness and Training Operational 
AU Audit and Accountability Technical 
CA Security Assessments and Authorization Management 
CM Configuration Management Operational 
CP Contingency Planning Operational 
IA Identification and Authentication Technical 
IR Incident Response Operational 
MA Maintenance Operational 
MP Media Protection Operational 
PE Physical and Environmental Protection Operational 
PL Planning Management 
PS Personnel Security Operational 
RA Risk Assessment Management 
SA System and Services Acquisition Management 
SC System and Communications Protection Technical 
SI System and Information Integrity Operational 
PM Program Management  Management 
 
 
Management controls are controls that focus on the management of risk and the 
management of the organization systems (Stouffer, 2005).  Operational controls are 
security controls primarily implemented and executed by personnel as opposed to the 
system (Stouffer, 2005).  Technical controls are security controls primarily implemented 
and executed by the organization through mechanisms contained in the hardware, 
software or firmware components of the system (Stouffer, 2005). 
To identify each security control, a numeric identifier is appended to the family 
identifier to indicate the number of the control within the family.  For example, AU-5 is 
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the fifth control in the Audit and Accountability family.  The security control structure 
consists of the following components: (1) a control section, (2) a supplemental guidance 
section, (3) a control enhancements section, (4) a references section, and (v) a priority 
and baseline allocation section. The following is an example of a control from the 
Personnel Security family, control number 2 taken from SP 800-53, Appendix F: 
PS-2 POSITION CATEGORY 
  Control:  The organization: 
a.  Assigns a risk designation to all positions 
b. Establishes screening criteria for individuals filling those positions 
c. Reviews and revises position risk designations [Assignment: 
organization-defined frequency] 
Supplemental Guidance: Position risk designations are consistent with 
Office of Personnel Management policy and guidance. The screening 
criteria includes an explicit information security role and appointment 
requirements (e.g., training, security clearance). 
Control Enhancements: None. 
References: 5 CFR 731.106(a). 
Priority and Baseline Allocation: 
P1 LOW  PS-2 MOD  PS-2 HIGH  PS-2 
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SECURITY CONTROL SECTIONS 
Control section: The control section provides a concise statement of the 
specific security capabilities needed to protect a particular aspect the 
information system. 
Supplemental section:  The supplemental guidance provides important 
considerations for implementing security controls in the context of an 
organization’s operational environment, mission requirements, or assessment 
of risk. Security control enhancements may also contain supplemental 
guidance. 
Security control enhancements: The control enhancements are used in an 
information system requiring greater protection due to the potential impact of 
loss or when organizations seek additions to the basic control functionality 
based on the results of a risk assessment. 
References section: The references section includes a list of applicable federal 
laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, standards, and guidelines that are 
relevant to a particular security control or control enhancement. 
Priority and baseline allocation: The priority and baseline allocation section 
provides: (1) the recommended priority codes used for sequencing decisions 
during security control implementation, and (2) the initial allocation of 
security controls and control enhancements for low-impact, moderate-impact, 
and high-impact information systems. 
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DoD and ICS IA 
The DoD relies on SCADA systems that control critical infrastructure processes 
maintained by both the defense sector and private industry to support its mission and 
operations.  To help find IA solutions for SCADA systems, the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Science & Technology encouraged the Small Business Technology 
Transfer (STTR) program to sponsor research focused on information assurance of 
SCADA systems (OSD, 2009).  For example, proposal OSD09-T003, is asking for the 
development of innovative software and data protection technology that improves the 
security of SCADA and Distributed Control Systems (DCS).   
DoD working groups are coordinating efforts to transition DoDI 8500.2 IA controls 
to those contained in the NIST 800-53 (DIACAP, 2010).  This indicates that the DoD 
ICS C&A guidance will be revised in the future.  However, the DoD currently has no 
specific C&A guidance for SCADA systems.  ICS are considered a subset of platform IT 
(PIT) systems.  These systems physically interact with the environment and only perform 
information processing assigned to it by its hosting special purpose system (ETL 9-11, 
2009).  Normally, C&A is not required for PIT.  However, security requirements must be 
addressed in system design and operation as prescribed in current guidance and policy.  If 
the PIT has connectivity to an external network then the C&A process is required as a 
PIT Interconnection (PITI) (ETL 9-11, 2009).  
The C&A process for PITI is mandatory regardless of the persistence of the boundary 
interconnection (e.g., always-connected Ethernet, wireless connection, dial-up 
connection).   PITI refers to network access to PIT and has readily identifiable security 
considerations and needs that must be addressed in both acquisition and operations (ETL 
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9-11, 2009).  IA controls listed in Information Assurance (IA) Implementation (DoDI 
8500.2), and draft, Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security (NIST SP 800-82), are 
designed to complement each other when addressing the uniqueness of PIT or PITI (ETL 
9-11, 2009). 
DoD IA Controls 
IA controls establish baseline levels of availability, integrity and confidentiality of 
any given system depending on the mission assurance category (MAC) and 
confidentiality needs.  Due to limited resources and vast competing interests, DoD 
information systems have to be categorized in importance or mission impact levels, 
particularly the combat mission.  The MAC level reflects the importance of information 
relative to the achievement of DoD goals and objectives.  The DoD has defined three 
MAC levels and are listed and defined in Table 5.  MAC I requires the highest level of 
integrity and availability, whereas MAC III requires the lowest. 
Table 6.  Mission Assurance Categories (DoDI  8500.2) 
Mission Assurance Category 
(MAC) Levels: 
Data Mission Impact 
I Data is vital to the mission. The consequences of loss of 
integrity or availability of a MAC I system are unacceptable.  
Mission Assurance Category I systems require the most 
stringent protection measures (DoDI 8500.2 para E2.1.38.1). 
II Data is important to the mission. The consequences of loss 
of integrity are unacceptable. Loss of availability is difficult 
to deal with and can only be tolerated for a short time. 
Mission Assurance Category II systems require additional 
safeguards beyond best practices to ensure assurance (DoDI 
8500.2 para E2.1.38.2). 
III Data is necessary for the conduct of day-to-day business, but 
does not materially affect the mission. The consequences of 
loss of integrity or availability can be tolerated or overcome 
without significant impacts on mission.  Mission Assurance 
Category III systems require protective measures, 
techniques, or procedures generally commensurate with 
commercial best practices (DoDI 8500.2 para E2.1.38.3). 
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The baseline set of IA controls are pre-defined based on determination of the MAC 
and Confidentiality Levels (CL) as required by the information system owner.  The 
baseline IA Controls for each of the combinations of MAC and CL are outlined in the 
enclosures to DoDI 8500.2 (AFI 33-200, 2008). Confidentiality levels are primarily used to 
establish acceptable access factors, such as requirements for individual security 
clearances or background investigations, access approvals, and need-to-know 
determinations, interconnection controls and approvals, and acceptable methods by which 
users may access the system (e.g., intranet, internet, wireless) (DoDI 8580.1, 2004).  The 
DoD has defined three confidentiality levels.  Table 6 list the definition of each 
confidentiality level. 
Table 7 Confidentiality Levels (DoDI 8580.1, 2004) 
Confidentiality 
Level 
Definition 
Classified Systems process classified information 
Sensitive 
Systems process sensitive information to include any unclassified 
information not cleared for public release 
Public Systems process publicly releasable information  
 
 
There are four parts to each IA Control: 
 
1. Subject Area:  One of eight groups indicating the major subject or 
focus area.  
 
2. Control Number:  Unique identifier comprised of four letters, a dash, 
and a number.  The first two letters are an abbreviation of the subject 
area, the second two letters are an abbreviation of control name and 
the number represents a level of robustness. 
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3. Control Name:  A brief phrase describing the individual IA control 
4. Control Text:  Description of IA condition or state that the IA control 
is intended to achieve. 
Table 8.  DoD IA Control Subject Areas (DoDD 8500.2) 
Abbreviation Subject Area Name 
Number of Controls in 
Subject Area 
DC Security Design & Configuration             31 
IA Identification and Authentication                    9 
EC 
Enclave and Computing 
Environment 
48 
EB Enclave Boundary Defense               8 
PE Physical and Environmental              27 
PR Personnel               7 
CO Continuity              24 
VI 
Vulnerability and Incident 
Management 
              3 
        Total = 157 
 
 
 Table 8 provides a listing of the DoDD IA subject areas and abbreviations.  
Figure 7 illustrates an example of the IA control taxonomy.  Table 9 provides an example 
for data at rest of an IA control with varying levels of robustness.  ECCR-1 calls for 
NIST certified cryptography while ECCR-3 calls for more stringent NSA-approved 
cryptography.  The higher the control level number, the highest the level of robustness.
 
Figure 7.  DoD IA Control Taxonomy (DoDD 8500.2) 
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The DAA or DoD community of interest representatives may add additional IA 
controls to locally augment the security baseline control set, only if the augmented 
controls will increase the security established by the enterprise baseline IA controls 
(DIACAP, 2010).  There are security guides designed to help implement IA controls such 
as the Security Technical Implementation Guides (STIG). 
Table 9.  IA Control Example 
IA 
Control 
Control 
Level 
MAC Subject Area Control Name Definition 
ECCR-1 1 II Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at Rest) 
If required by the information 
owner, NIST-certified 
cryptography is used to 
encrypt stored sensitive 
information. 
ECCR-2 2 II Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at Rest) 
If required by the information 
owner, NIST-certified 
cryptography is used to 
encrypt stored classified non-
SAMI information.  
ECCR-3 3 II Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at Rest) 
If a classified enclave contains 
SAMI and is accessed by 
individuals lacking an 
appropriate clearance for 
SAMI, then NSA-approved 
cryptography is used to 
encrypt all SAMI stored 
within the enclave. 
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III. Methodology 
Overview 
This chapter presents the research methodology and statistical procedures used during 
this research effort. This chapter will present the survey instrument design, the data 
collection method, the sample selection criteria, and the statistical procedures used to 
analyze the data gathered. 
Mapping DoD and NIST IA Controls 
Comparing and mapping IA controls from the NIST SP 800-82 to the DoD IA 
Control framework is the primary focus of this research endeavor. A comprehensive list 
of ICS IA controls were carefully scrutinized for clarity in definition, applicability to 
DoD control systems, and persistent semantic translation.   A numbered coding schema 
was constructed to map the linkages between IA control items.  An example of the coding 
schema and associated definitions are provided in Table 10. The final coding schema and 
associated mappings are provided in Appendix F. 
Table 10. Correlation Codes 
Code Definition 
8 NIST requirement and DoD IA control are equivalent 
9 NIST requirement is more specific than the DoD IA control 
11 NIST requirement has no counterpart in the DoD IA control 
17 NIST requirement is less specific than the DoD IA control 
 
 
Comparing security controls produced by different organizations is difficult and 
subject to interpretation (Katzke et. al, 2006).  While the mapping discussed in this thesis 
represents a significant effort by a number of experts, there are no guarantees that the 
mapping is completely accurate or correct (Katzke et. al, 2006).  Controls were compared 
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using semantic analysis to preserve the definition, intent and meaning of the IA control. 
IA controls that deviated from these areas were deferred to the survey instrument for 
subject matter experts resolution.  
If substantial agreement can be achieved among the civil engineering SME 
community, then the recommended definition can be a potential IA control candidate.  
This procedure is consistent with other similar efforts and is considered adequate to make 
comparisons and draw some conclusions (Katzke et. al, 2006).  Although the granularity 
and level of abstraction of the security control sets being compared are not always the 
same, using a SME consensus approach preserves precision of definition and minimizes 
differences in interpretation and judgment (Abrams, 2007).  
Survey Instrument  
The survey instrument is divided into three sections. Section one contains five 
questions related to demographic information of the participants, section two contains a 
listing of control area categories in a table format for ease of creating rankings, and 
section three contains eight recommended IA security controls for evaluation by 
participants using a 5-point Likert scale. The survey instrument design combines 
recommended best practices from a variety of sources to derive a specific set of IA 
controls that can be incorporated into the DoD IA control framework. Many ICS or 
SCADA IA controls map to the DoD framework with no translation required. However, 
other IA controls were so specific to ICS or SCADA that some interpretation or 
translation is required.  The survey contains the set of ICS or SCADA IA controls that 
require:  
(1) translation to fit into an “existing” DoD IA control subject category 
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or 
(2) interpretation to fit into a “newly created” DoD IA control subject category 
SME participants were asked to rank NIST ICS IA control categories in what they 
perceive is most important to day-to-day operations.  Additionally, subjects were asked to 
rate the measurement of agreement on proposed modifications to existing DoD IA 
controls and the addition of new DoD IA controls.  This survey should provide feedback 
about the security controls the DoD ICS community feels are most important to secure 
ICSs.  Additionally, the survey should help gauge if those priorities are being met by the 
current DoD IA controls. 
Pilot Survey 
The survey instrument was pilot tested by with two groups of personnel. One group 
had little IA control exposure and focused on testing the functionality, layout, and the 
clarity of instruction of the survey instrument. The second group had varying degrees of 
exposure to IA controls and tested the items, definitions, and reasonableness of the 
survey instrument. The pilot survey personnel consisted of graduate students attending 
the Air Force Institute of Technology.  Their feedback resulted in changes to various 
questions, rewording instructions, and changing various elements of the layout design to 
improve readability.   
Population 
The target population is USAF Industrial Control Systems subject matter experts 
(SMEs) from the civil engineering community.  The sample was drawn from personnel 
stationed at various bases located with the Continental United States (CONUS) and 
Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS) representing as many major 
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commands as possible.  The personnel included in the sample were specifically targeted 
because they met the following criteria: 
• They represent a good cross section of the USAF population of Civil Engineer 
subject matter experts  
• They have been exposed to management principles for securing control systems 
from cyber threats through industry certification or other formally recognized education 
• They have a vested interest in getting this right for the USAF and the DoD 
community 
• They volunteered to participate in the study 
Sampling Strategy 
The sampling procedure used for this research was convenience sampling.  A 
convenience sample is a procedure where the subjects are selected, in part or in whole, at 
the convenience of the researcher.  This approach is a specific type of non-probability 
sampling which involves the sample being drawn from that part of the population which 
is readily available.  In this case, the desired sample should consist of a good cross 
section of U.S. Air Force personnel from the civil engineering community. Furthermore, 
it is desired to achieve a good cross sectional representation of U.S. Air Force major 
commands.   
Research Approval 
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
reviewed and approved the study and survey instrument for this research. Additionally, 
this study qualified for an IRB exemption because it contains research activities in which 
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the only involvement of human subjects was covered by an exemption category. 
Appendix I contains the AFIT IRB waiver approval.  
 Additionally, in accordance with Air Force Instruction 36-2601, all surveys 
administered to U.S. Air Force personnel must first be approved and assigned a survey 
control number by the Air Force Survey Branch (AFSB) at the Air Force Personnel 
Center (AFPC). An acceptable alternative to AFSB approval is to obtain a commanders 
approval to conduct the survey of U.S. Air Force personnel.  Permission to survey U.S. 
Air Force civil engineering personnel was authorized by the Air Force Civil Engineering 
Support Agency (AFCESA).  Appendix G contains the AFCESA approval memorandum. 
Data Collection Method 
The survey instrument was electronically distributed to the respondents via electronic 
mail (email) as an attached document. All participants were asked to respond with a 
digitally signed email as a measure of validating the identity and authenticity of the 
respondent in an online environment. This procedure is feasible because the participants 
are expected to use a DoD Common Access Card (CAC) to access email services. As an 
additional measure to preserve anonymity, the participant email address was inserted into 
the blind carbon copy field. This technique is a reasonable measure to preserve the 
secrecy of the intended recipient in email communications. Responses were stored on a 
network server in a password protected folder at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  
The survey instrument is provided in appendix H. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
The data analysis phase of this study focused on (1) describing the perceived 
importance of NIST ICS security controls to the day-to-day operation of DoD ICS 
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controls and (2) the level of agreement among SMEs to recommended new and modified 
DoD IA controls specific to ICS. Part one consists of matched pairs of rankings that 
measure the strength of the association and perceived importance of Security Control 
Area categories among US Air Force civil engineering SMEs. Part two, consists of eight 
recommended ICS security controls that address gaps in the current DoD IA controls 
framework. The next section will describe the procedures for both parts.  
Part I: Paired Rankings  
Respondents were randomly assigned into one of two groups. Ranked responses were 
rank ordered from 1 through k items for each group. Ties were resolved by preserving 
group bias towards the frequency of higher rank frequency count for each element. In 
rare case that an absolute tie occurs, the element will be averaged over the tied element. 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient (rho) non-parametric statistical test is 
employed to measure association for the paired rankings (Conover, 1980).  This statistic 
reflects the degree of association between the ranks of the responses.  Association is a 
depiction of the relationship between two variables, but does not indicate any causal 
relationship (Gibbons, 1976).   
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Table 11. ICS IA Controls Grouped Rankings 
Control Area Category (Rankings:  1 - 4) 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
M
g
m
n
t 
C
o
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tr
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ls
 Risk Assessment   
 
Planning  
 
 
System and Service Acquisition 
 
 
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments  
 
 
Control Area Category (Rankings:  1 - 15) 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
O
p
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n
a
l 
C
o
n
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o
ls
 
Personnel Security  
 
 
Physical & Environmental Protection 
 
 
Control Center/Control Room  
 
 
Portable Devices  
 
 
Cabling 
 
 
Contingency Planning 
 
 
Disaster Recovery Planning  
 
 
Configuration Management  
 
 
System and Information Integrity 
 
 
Malicious Code Detection  
 
 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
 
 
Patch Management 
 
 
Media Protection  
 
 
Incident Response  
 
 
Awareness and Training  
 
 
Control Area Category (Rankings:  1 - 11) 
Group 
1 
Group 
2 
T
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h
n
ic
a
l 
C
o
n
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o
ls
 
Identification and Authentication  
 
 
Password Authentication  
 
 
Physical Token Authentication 
 
 
Role-Based Access Control  
 
 
Web Servers  
 
 
Virtual Local Area Network  
 
 
Dial-up Modems  
 
 
Wireless 
 
 
Audit and Accountability 
 
 
Encryption  
 
 
Virtual Private Network (VPN)  
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Typically the quality of ordered categorical data is determined from repeated 
measurements on the same subject in order to assess the level of agreement between 
raters, scales or occasions. Since repeated measurements are not incorporated into the 
research design, randomly assigning raters to a group for rank-ordered analysis helps to 
preserve the quality of ordered categorical recordings. Consequently, this procedure helps 
to identify large departures of inter-rater bias. Table 11 is an illustrated example of the 
group rank-ordered items used for the study. 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation Coefficient (Rho) 
Rho is a non-parametric measure of the linear relationship between two variables. 
When using Spearman’s rho, the null hypothesis indicates the absence of an association 
between the two tested variables. The alternative indicates the existence of an association 
between the variables. It is similar to the parametric version of Pearson’s product-
moment correlation coefficient except it is adjusted for ranked observations (Gibbons, 
1976).  
This study provided three sets of data for the participants to rank. Set one consists of 
4 Management controls items, set two consists of 15 Operational controls, and set three 
consists of 11 Technical controls. The rankings are in perfect agreement if the ranks for 
each item are identical. They are in perfect disagreement if the ranks are in complete 
reverse order (Gibbons, 1976).  
The differences between the ranks are used as a measure of their disagreement 
(Gibbons, 1976). This measure of disagreement (R) ranges from -1 to 1. When R = 0 
there is no association and therefore no agreement or disagreement between the overall 
rank comparisons. Similarly, when R = -1 of R = 1, there is either perfect disagreement or 
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perfect agreement, respectively, between the overall rank comparisons. The sign of the R 
statistic indicates the direction of association, not the strength of association (Conover, 
1980). Figure 9 provides the formula for computing Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient (Conover, 1980):  
 
Figure 8.  Spearman's Rho (Conover, 1980) 
Part II: Recommended ICS Security Controls   
Part two consists of 8 recommended ICS controls for comparison and interpretation 
of definitions. Measurement level is operationalized through a 5-point Likert scale. The 
scale range allows the respondent to choose varying degrees of agreement as follows: (1) 
strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) neutral, (4) agree and (5) strongly agree.   All five 
responses are equally weighted. The 5-point Likert scale is a “higher better” metric 
meaning the higher, the value the more favorable the attitude and agreement with the 
recommendation provided for the participant. A description and analysis are presented in 
the next chapter.
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IV. Data Analysis 
The main goal of this research is to ascertain if there is more than marginal consensus 
among the US Air Force civil engineering SME community for recommended 
information assurance controls to address security concerns specific to DoD SCADA 
systems. This chapter presents an overview and analysis of the survey results using the 
statistical procedures previously discussed in the methodology section.  
Demographic Information 
Demographic information was collected from the participants during the survey 
process. This information was collected in order to help ensure that the sample was 
representative of the desired population as well as for future research. The demographic 
portion of the survey contained 5 questions. 
Question 1: Major Command Representation 
Participants were asked to list which major command (MAJCOM) they are associated 
with. Figure 12 provides the MAJCOM representation distribution of the respondents 
across the U.S. Air Force.   In total, 8 out of 10 (80%) of the MAJCOM’s are represented 
in the sample. The two MAJCOM’s not represented were the Air Force Global Strike 
Command (AFGSC) and U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Both of these organizations 
were targeted for sampling. However, no subjects from either organization volunteered to 
participate in the survey. One reason for the lack of participation from AFGSC could be 
that the command was recently created in December 2009 and is focused on their 
responsibilities for the U.S. nuclear arsenal.  
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One reason for the lack of participation from USAFE could be the subjects perceive 
their controls systems hosted in foreign countries are potentially outside the scope of this 
research effort.  Future research in this area should ensure that these two MAJCOM’s are 
adequately represented. USAFE units are primarily located throughout Europe and utilize 
sufficiently different equipment vendors and SCADA protocols. Therefore, the results of 
this research should be validated with USAFE to ensure applicability to their SCADA 
environment.  
Question 2: Experience  
Participant experience with the management or operation of SCADA systems was 
collected.  The participants were asked to select their experience level from a list of the 
following five time periods: 
• less than 1 year 
• 1 – 3 years 
• 4 -7 years 
• 8 – 11 years 
• 12 or more years 
Table 11 illustrates the distribution of experience among the respondents. The results 
indicate that 70% of the respondents have 7 or less years of experience with the 
remaining 30% having extensive experience (i.e. 12 or more years). One interesting note 
is that 20 percent of the respondents have between one and three year and 20 percent 
have less than one year. This finding is interesting in that 40 percent of the participants 
are somewhat new to ICS. Although the data does not allow for a rigorous statistical 
analysis, the data indicates that 70% of the sample exhibit moderate experience levels. It 
is not known why the sample did not contain experience levels at the 8 – 11 years. 
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However, this gap is not expected to bias the results since the next higher tier is 
represented in the sample.   
                  Table 12. Respondent experience in years 
Years of 
Experience 
Percent of 
Subjects 
Less than one year 20% 
1 to 3 years 20% 
4 -7 years 30% 
8 to 11 years 00.0% 
12 or more 30% 
 
 
Question 3: Cyber Security Education  
Participants were asked to list any computer or network security training they 
have completed during their career.  The training covered a wide range of subject areas 
and was evenly spread across the group. The cyber security orientation of the sample is 
considered advanced based on the content of the topic areas provided by the respondents. 
Although there are a significant number of respondents relatively new to ICS, the sample 
appears to have a diverse background in cyber security education and training. Figure 10 
provides the cyber security training distribution of the sample.  
Figure 
Question 4: Cyber Security Certifications
In addition to education and training, respondents were asked to list any security or IT 
certifications they hold.  Certifications demonstrate knowledge in 
and ranged from server/client operations to network/infrastructure security.  Some of the
listed certifications are vendor 
(CCNA) and Server Plus (Server
neutral such as the Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) and 
Security Plus (Security+). Certifications are intended to validate a baseline level of 
knowledge or skill level. DoD has similarly adopted this philosophy and has 
implemented certifications as an essential component of professionalizing the IA 
workforce.   
 
USAF RED TEAM
20%
Cyber Security Training
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9.  Sample Cyber Security Training 
  
specific subject areas 
specific such as Cisco Certified Network Associate 
+). Other certifications listed are intended to be vendor 
UNWT
20%
SANS 401
20%
WGMT 580
20%
MS CE
20%
 
 
Figure 10
In total, 8 specific certifications were represented in the sample profile
out of the 8 certifications are contained within the DoD IA certification rubric outlined in 
the DoD IA Workforce Improvement Program.
8570 rubric segmented by technical and managerial categories and expertise levels. DoD 
personnel configuring, managing, and executing privileged access of SCADA systems 
are included in the IA workforce. The distribution of cyber security certifications among 
the sample provide sufficient evidence that the USAF CE community is well represented 
as part of the professional IA workforce. Furthermore, this indicates that the SME 
feedback will most likely be grounded on sound security principles underlying the 
framework for IA controls.  
SECURITY+
A+
Cyber Security Certifications
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.  Sample Cyber Security Certifications 
 (Figure 11)
 Figure 12 provides the DoD Directive 
CCNA
ITIL
NET+GSEC
SERVER+
CISSP
 
. 5 
 
 
50 
 
 
Figure 11. DoD Approved Baseline Certification (DoDD 8570) 
Question 5: Government Affiliation 
The final question in the demographics section asked the respondents to identify the 
affiliation with the government. The possible selections were (1) contractor, (2) military 
(Reserve, Guard, or Active Duty), (3) Civil Service employee, or (4) other. If the 
respondent selected “other”, they were asked to provide a description. In addition, the 
respondents were asked to select all categories that apply. This would allow the 
respondents to select multiple categories to ensure that appropriate coverage was 
considered. For example, there are civil service employees that are also serving in the US 
Air Force Reserve as a civil engineer. In this scenario, the participant could identify their 
affiliation as a civil service employee and a US Air Force Reserve employee.   
Table 13 provides the government affiliation distribution. The sample contains no 
contractors, 40% military (75% active duty, 25% reserve, and 0% guard), and 60% 
civilians. This mixture provides an adequate representation of the CE community across 
the US Air Force enterprise. This study achieved an adequate balance in the affiliation 
representation.   
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Table 13. Government Affiliation Distribution 
Government 
Affiliation 
Percent of 
Subjects 
Contractors 0 % 
Civil Service 60% 
Military 40% 
  -Active Duty (75%)  
  -Reserve (25 %)  
 
 
IA Controls Rankings 
The next section of the survey instrument asked the participants to rank the various 
security controls. Security controls are fundamental safeguards or countermeasures 
prescribed for an informational system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability of the system and its information (Stouffer, K., J. Falco, et al., 2008).  The 
security controls are grouped according to functional activities required to implement a 
safeguard or countermeasure and are identified as a (1) management control, (2) 
operational control, or (3) technical control. Participants were asked to independently 
rank the controls within each category in order of importance to the management or day-
to-day operation of SCADA systems. This approach will help to capture and identify the 
perceptions of CE community personnel toward IA controls. 
Since repeated measurements for each respondent will not be conducted during this 
research, the respondents were randomly assigned to one of two groups.  Random 
assignment of respondents to one of two groups for rank-ordered analysis helps to 
preserve the quality of ordered categorical recordings. Consequently, this procedure helps 
to identify large departures of inter-rater bias. Furthermore, creating two groups prepares 
the data for statistical analysis using the Spearman’s rank correlation procedure.  
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The sample size is n = 10. The random assignment process placed respondents 1, 3, 5, 
8, and 10 in group A, and respondents 2, 4, 6, 7, and 9 in group B. The ranked responses 
for each group in each security control category were tallied and rank ordered from 1 
through k items. Table 14 provides the group ranked data elements to compute 
Spearman’s rho statistic figure 9.  The rho statistic for this data set is ρ = .972414.  
To determine if this result is statistically significant, the ρ must be compared to a 
table of critical values for Spearman’s Rho. The level of significance for this research is 
set at α = .05. Table 15 shows that the critical value for n = 30 (grouped pairs) at α = .05 
is .364. Since ρ = .972414 > .364 we can conclude that the obtained result is statistically 
significant at the .05 level of significance. This result is substantial and provides 
sufficient evidence to conclude that any high level of agreement or disagreement among 
the respondents is not likely to occur by chance.  
At this juncture, closer scrutiny of the rankings among the respondents by control 
group category will be analyzed. Rankings among the CE SME community will provide 
insight of their perceptions of the importance of IA controls relevant to SCADA systems. 
This information will be used in conjunction with part III of the survey instrument to 
provide depth to the interpretive analysis of the 8 recommended IA controls. 
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Table 14. Group ranked data and Spearman's Rho computation 
 
 
1 1 1 1
3 2 -1 1
2 3 0 0
4 4 2 4
5 3 0 0
2 2 -3 9
10 13 -3 9
12 15 0 0
14 14 -2 4
9 11 0 0
6 6 -3 9
7 10 0 0
1 1 -2 4
3 5 0 0
4 4 3 9
11 8 3 9
15 12 6 36
13 7 -1 1
8 9 0 0
1 1 0 0
3 3 -3 9
7 10 -2 4
2 4 0 0
8 8 1 1
10 9 0 0
11 11 -1 1
6 7 0 0
5 5 2 4
4 2 3 9
9 6 0 0
sum 124
rho 0.972414
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Table 15. Critical values for Spearman’s Rho (Zar, 1982) 
 
Ranked Management Controls 
All respondents had strong agreement with the 1 - 4 rankings of management 
controls. They had perfect agreement for item 1 (Risk Assessment) and item 4 
(Certification, Accreditation & Security Assessments (C&A)). Item 2 (System and 
Service Acquisition) and item 3 (Planning interchanged positions between the two groups 
which clearly places these two items in the middle of the rankings. There is no surprise 
that risk assessment was ranked number one by the CE SME community. Risks 
associated with safety, health, environment-related or economic typically result in 
unrecoverable consequences (Stouffer, et al., 2008). 
Item 4  – Certification, Accreditation and Security Assessment 
What was most revealing among the four rankings in management controls is the 
placement of Certification & Accreditation last. C&A is a process that ensures that 
systems and major applications adhere to formal and established security requirements 
N 0.05 0.02 0.01
5 1 1 N/A
6 0.886 0.943 1
7 0.786 0.893 0.929
8 0.738 0.833 0.881
9 0.683 0.783 0.833
10 0.648 0.746 0.794
12 0.591 0.712 0.777
14 0.544 0.645 0.715
16 0.506 0.601 0.665
18 0.475 0.564 0.625
20 0.450 0.534 0.591
22 0.428 0.508 0.562
24 0.409 0.485 0.537
26 0.392 0.465 0.515
28 0.377 0.448 0.496
30 0.364 0.432 0.478
α level of significance
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that are well documented and authorized. C&A is required by the Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002. All systems and applications that reside on 
U.S. government networks must go through a formal C&A before being put into 
production, and every three years thereafter. Since accreditation is the ultimate output of 
a C&A initiative, and a system or application cannot be accredited unless it meets 
specific security guidelines, clearly the goal of C&A is to force federal agencies to put 
into production systems and applications that are secure. This is counter to the perception 
expressed by the CE SME community.  
Considering that management controls only address a mere 4 items in the 
management control category (as compared to 15 operational controls and 11 technical 
controls), one would expect C&A to rank high on the list since the process places 
emphasis on the system meeting specific security requirements. Further research should 
be conducted in this area to ascertain what the contributing factors for this perception gap 
are. Table 16 lists the final combined group rankings for the management controls 
category. 
Table 16. Ranked Management Controls 
Rank Management Controls 
1 Risk Assessment 
2 System and Service Acquisition 
3 Planning 
4 Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments 
 
 
Ranked Operational Controls 
In the operational control category, the top five ranked controls in order of 
importance are (1) System & Information Integrity, (2) Physical and Environmental 
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Protection, (3) Personnel Security, (4) Malicious Code Detection, and (5) Intrusion 
Detection and Prevention. There was no serious disagreement among the CE SME 
community with the top five operational controls. Some rearrangement between items 3 
(Personnel Security) and 5 (Intrusion Detection and Prevention) occurred but not 
substantial in position to warrant disparity among raters. The bottom three ranked 
controls were (13) Media Protection, (14) Portable Devices, and (15) Cabling. These 
bottom three rankings did not reveal substantial disagreement in rankings and is not 
surprising. Interesting findings for operational controls were in perfect agreement in item 
1 (System and Information Integrity), and moderate disagreement between items 6 
(Disaster Recovery) and 10 (Contingency Planning).  
Item 1 – System and Information Integrity 
Information and System Integrity as the number one ranked item under operational 
controls is a substantial finding. Table 17 provides the final ranked operational controls. 
Table 17. Ranked Operational Controls 
Rank Operational Controls 
1 System and Information Integrity 
2 Physical & Environmental Protection 
3 Personnel Security 
4 Malicious Code Detection 
5 Intrusion Detection and Prevention 
6 Disaster Recovery Planning 
7 Configuration Management 
8 Awareness and Training 
9 Patch Management 
10 Contingency Planning 
11 Incident Response 
12 Control Center/Control Room 
13 Media Protection 
14 Portable Devices 
15 Cabling 
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Traditionally, SCADA systems were designed as standalone networks with little to no 
connectivity to outside networks or systems. They are designed to be monitored through 
Human Machine Interface (HMI) on a 24 hour-7 days a week basis with little system 
interruption. Under these operating conditions, SCADA systems did not exhibit 
significant vulnerabilities to system and information integrity issues. However, the rapid 
increase in the use of internetworking protocols and connectivity to enterprise networks 
now make SCADA systems increasingly vulnerable to system and information integrity 
issues. The CE SME community is likely to have developed an aptitude for recognizing 
this vulnerability based on the exposure to the type of cyber security education and cyber 
security certifications they have received (see Figure 10 and 11). The importance of this 
observation when considering the 14 other operational controls the respondents could 
choose from cannot be overstated. This is an operational control priority among the CE 
SME community.   
Item 6 & 10 – Disaster Recovery and Contingency Planning 
Although both groups had perfect agreement of the ranking for disaster recovery 
(ranked number six), there was moderate disagreement of the ranking for contingency 
planning ranked number (Group A ranked 7, group B ranked 10). Although the 
definitions are closely related and have considerable overlap in application, there persists 
disagreement on their importance in the rankings. This might be related to the (1) 
distributed nature of SCADA systems across a large geographic region, and (2) the 
continued upward trend to utilize Internet Protocols for communications paths. 
Geographic spread and their associated physical boundary for contingency planning can 
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be rationalized and is rather trivial to visualize. However, logical boundaries and the 
continued blurring of where SCADA network ends and the Enterprise network begins 
along with the associated responsibilities for contingency planning become more difficult 
to plan for. 
Ranked Technical Controls 
In the technical control category, the top five ranked controls in order of importance 
are (1) Identification and Authentication, (2) Encryption, (3) Role Base Access Control, 
(4) Password Authentication, and (5) Audit & Accountability. There was no serious 
disagreement among the CE SME community with the top 5 technical controls. Some 
rearrangement for between items 2 (Encryption) and 4 (Password Authentication) 
occurred but a not substantial in position to warrant disagreement among raters. Table 18 
provides the final ranked technical controls. 
Table 18. Ranked Technical Controls 
Rank Technical Controls 
1 Identification and Authentication 
2 Encryption 
3 Role-Based Access Control  
4 Password Authentication 
5 Audit and Accountability 
6 Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
7 Wireless 
8 Web Servers 
9 Physical Token Authentication 
10 Virtual Local Area Network 
11 Dial-up Modems 
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What is interesting in this segment is how high they ranked encryption. Encryption is 
typically the method by which to operationalize confidentiality as a security goal. 
Confidentially is usually ranked very low as a security goal in a SCADA environment.  
The confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA) triad is a widely used information 
assurance model that identifies three fundamental security characteristics (Harris, 2003) 
Confidentiality provides some degree of assurance for data privacy.  It is a well known 
system engineering principal that encryption can degrade the operational performance of 
the system (Stouffer, K., J. Falco, et al., 2008). It is also known that availability is a 
major design goal for SCADA systems. Therefore, it is an interesting finding that the CE 
SME community would rank encryption number two for technical controls.  
Analysis of this finding is a bit difficult to interpret. However, one possible 
explanation is the perception and alignment gap between confidentiality and integrity 
among the respondents. SCADA system traffic does not typically contain messages that 
require privacy assurance of content unlike traditional information systems that store, 
process, display, and transmit email messages or corporate documents. A possible 
explanation is the misconception of the CE SME community of the security goal that is 
provided by encryption.  They potentially desire to ensure the integrity of response 
messages during data acquisition and command messages during supervisory control. 
This position is reinforced by the fact that the (1) respondents placed significant value in 
System and Information Integrity under the operational controls (ranked number one) 
coupled with the (2) moderate amount of cyber security education and cyber security 
certifications of the respondents. Encryption can be deployed as part of a comprehensive 
security plan. However, encryption is not an appropriate mechanism, in most cases, to 
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ensure integrity on SCADA networks. Additional research should be conducted in this 
area to further explain the alignment gap between confidentially and integrity among the 
CE SME community managing and operating SCADA systems.  
IA Controls Agreement Measurements  
The final section of the survey instrument contained 8 recommended IA controls 
for the participants to review. Of the 8 questions provided, the first three questions 
recommend IA control definitions that are not adequately addressed in the DoD IA 
controls framework but could fit under an existing IA control category.  Five additional 
questions recommend IA control definitions and additionally recommend a new sub-
category to be added to the DoD IA controls framework. Semantic translation of the 
NIST definitions preserved the intent of the specific IA control and made it adaptable to 
the DoD IA control framework.  
The definitions and associated IA Control category and subcategory were 
provided in a table format for ease of comparison by each evaluator. The participants 
were asked to express their level of agreement, using a 5-point Likert scale, with the 
following criteria; (1) appropriate fit under the major DoD IA control category, (2) 
conciseness of the definition, and (3) appropriateness of the new sub-category. Table 19 
provides a summary of the responses for all respondents.  
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Table 19.  DoD IA Controls Response Summary 
 
Part A:  Incorporating ICS security control wording to existing DoD IA controls 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Q1:  Role Based Access Control to ECLP 00% 00% 10% 50% 40% 
 
Q2:  Dial-up Modem to EBRP 00% 10% 00% 40% 50% 
 
Q3:  Web Servers to EBRP 00% 30% 10% 20% 40% 
 
Part B:  New DoD IA controls encompassing ICS security not covered by DoD  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
Q4:  Physical Environment Toxic   
        substance (PETS) 00% 00% 10% 50% 40% 
Q5:  Physical Environment Blast  
        Protection (PEBP) 00% 10% 20% 20% 50% 
Q6:  Physical Environment Access  
        Controls to ICS Devices (PEAD) 00% 30% 10% 40% 20% 
Q7:  Physical Environment Transmission  
        Medium Protection (PETP) 10% 00% 00% 30% 60% 
Q8:  Security Design and Configuration  
        Virtual Partitioning (DCVP) 00% 00% 10% 50% 40% 
 
 
IA Controls Response Summary Analysis 
In order to conduct an analysis of the responses collected, the data was bifurcated into 
two major categories. Responses that were affirmative (agree and strongly agree) were 
placed in the Agree group. Responses that were negative (disagree and strongly disagree) 
were placed in the Disagree group. Responses with a neutral response were excluded 
from the analysis. Figure 13 contains the results of the two group comparison listed by 
question. The following sections will provide a narrative discussion and analysis of the 
results collected.  
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Figure 12.  IA Control Agreement 
 
Part A: Questions 1 - 3 
Question 1:  There is strong SME consensus to add Role Based Access Control 
(RBAC) into the Least Privilege DoD IA control subcategory. This result is not 
surprising since the SME’s ranked RBAC number 3 of 11 in the technical controls 
category.  
Question 2: There was slight disagreement from the respondents for placing dial-up 
modems under the Remote Access Privilege Function DoD IA control subcategory. The 
disagreement is primarily due to a difference in philosophy on remote access among the 
respondents. Some subjects stated that as long as the proper security measures were 
implemented, allowing remote dialing would be appropriate. Currently, USAF 
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Engineering Technical Letter 9-11 mandates the implementation of a voice protection 
system (VPS) which has a dial back feature. To illustrate the disagreement, in vivo 
extracts collected from respondents are provided below. 
One respondent believes this is an adequate security safeguard to restrict remote 
access by dial-up modem and states, “[…] it has the ability to do logging activity with 
other policy enforcement.  The Voice Protection System would add another layer of 
protection for all Dial-up Modems in an ICS.” 
Another respondent disagreed and stated that “[…] no remote access should be 
permitted; only voice-capable modems should be allowed for after hours alarm 
notifications.”  The final disagreement was essentially over the definition specificity. It 
was suggested that the DoD IA controls, as currently written, properly cover general 
practices and do not require additional details to describe form and function. Given the 
extensive use of modems in SCADA systems, this item remains open for additional 
discussion and clarification from the SCADA community at large. 
Question 3:  There was no consensus on the issue of Web servers as a product option 
in SCADA system. The respondents were evenly split on this topic. Web Servers are now 
offered as product options on historian servers for access outside of control rooms. 
Furthermore, Programmable Logic Controllers, and other control devices are increasingly 
being offered with embedded web and email servers to generate email notifications when 
certain conditions occur. This is an entirely new area for SCADA systems and operators 
alike. Traditional use of these services causes confusion for SCADA personnel when 
these services are made available on a control system. This partially explains the split 
decision from the CE SME community. A better understanding of how Web services can 
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or should be incorporated into control systems is largely unexplored and causes this item 
to remain an open issue. Additional discussion and clarification from the SCADA 
community at large is required to resolve this item. 
The disagreement is primarily due to subjects not seeing the addition of web, ftp, and 
email capabilities fitting into the Remote Access for Privilege functions category.  
Subjects see it fitting better under a least privileged type of category or a totally new 
category.  Also, subjects stated that there is no reason for remote access outside of the 
control room.  There may some rare cases for remote access due to ICS isolation from the 
base.  Just like Q2, the final disagreement was about wording.  The DoD IA covers 
general practices and does not go into details pertaining equipment, there is no need to 
make it more explicit or detailed for types of functions. 
Part B: Questions 4 - 8 
Question 4 & 5: There is also majority consensus for including questions 4 
(Environmental Control Systems – HVAC) and question 5 (Control Center/Control 
Room) as new subcategories in DoD IA controls. However, both questions contained 
neutral responses (1 and 2 respectively) and were omitted in the agree/disagree 
determination. 
Question 6: There is moderate disagreement in the definition and category placement 
of question 6 (Portable Devices). Respondents provided narrative that indicates that there 
is considerable variation in defining portable devices in a SCADA environment. The 
main issue is in an expanded version of portable includes portable equipment used by 
field engineers that fall outside the traditional definition of portable devices in the IT 
arena. Further work in this area is needed to more succinctly define the scope and 
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function of portable devices as they specifically apply to the SCADA environment. This 
item will remain open for further discussion by the SCADA community at large. 
Question 7:   There is strong SME consensus to add question 7 (Cabling) as a new 
subcategory (Transmission Medium Protection) under the Physical and Environment 
DoD IA control category. The respondents ranked this control last (15 of 15) in the 
technical controls category. This does not make it any less important and must be 
addressed in any formal cyber risk assessment of a SCADA environment. 
Question 8:  There is strong SME consensus to add question 8 (Virtual Local Area 
Network - VLAN) as a new subcategory (Virtual Partitioning) under the Security Design 
and Configuration DoD IA control category. This is not a surprising result. VLAN 
architecture is rapidly advancing as a technique to partition portions of the SCADA from 
an enterprise network. Although the technique is gaining momentum among the IT 
community that must provide service to SCADA components inside the enterprise 
network (e.g. historian server or HMI) the security benefits are not well understood at this 
juncture. This item should be considered for inclusion in the DoD IA control framework 
with an expanded definition. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
There is moderate consensus among the US Air Force civil engineering SME 
community for recommended information assurance controls to address security concerns 
specific to DoD SCADA Systems. Some DoD IA control definitions should be modified 
(listed in chapter IV) to include explicit language relevant to SCADA systems.   
The research methodology applied in this study appears to be a sound approach to 
conduct an initial estimate of gaps in the current DoD IA control framework. The study 
resulted in providing insight into the perceptions of the U.S. Air Force civil engineering 
SME community concerning 30 IA controls across three categories. Ranking results (ρ = 
.972414) indicate a high preference for encryption, and system and information integrity 
as key IA Controls to mitigate cyber risk. Equally interesting was the perfect agreement 
among raters on ranking certification and accreditation last as an effective IA control. 
Additionally, the respondents strongly favored including four new IA controls of the 
eight they considered. Several issues remain open and should be explored with a larger 
SME community to reach a consensus.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Questions that remain unresolved in this study should be fielded to a wider SME 
community and perhaps expanded to other service components.  For example, SMEs 
indicated a high preference for encryption as a key IA control to mitigate cyber risk while 
ranking certification and accreditation last as an effective IA control.  This is highly 
concerning as the DoD IA community relies very heavily on the C & A process to ensure 
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systems confidentiality, integrity and availability.  It is reasonable to infer that the DoD 
SCADA community finds that the C & A process is lacking or is inadequate to protect 
SCADA.  Further research should be conducted on this area. 
The AF Civil Engineering Support Agency created Engineering Technical Letter 
(ETL) 09-11:  Civil Engineering Industrial Control System Information Assurance 
Compliance to provide technical guidance and criteria for information assurance of civil 
engineering ICS’s. Future efforts can be directed at field-testing ETL 9-11 
implementation requirements.  A thorough analysis of first and second-order effects 
caused by ETL 9-11 implementation requirements can be helpful in accurately 
forecasting future needs resulting from ETL 9-11.  For example, proper ETL 
implementation can result in funding shortfalls, contract modifications, or manpower 
reallocation.  
Determining DoD SCADA vulnerability can be very difficult. Many limitations and 
operational restrictions can be imposed to DoD SCADA security and vulnerability 
assessments.   Future work can focus on developing relevant metrics and sound 
methodologies to assess operational SCADA systems.  
 
 
 
68 
 
Appendix A:  CIP Evolution 
CIP in the 80’s 
In the 1980’s critical infrastructure was considered as public works and 
transportation, its protection was important because the services that they provided 
“formed the underpinnings of the nation’s defense, a strong economy, and our health and 
safety (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).”   
The CBO, in 1983 defined infrastructures as facilities with “the common 
characteristics of capital intensiveness and high public investment at all levels of 
government. They are, moreover, directly critical to activity in the nation’s economy 
(CBO, 1983).”   The CBO included highways, public transit systems, wastewater 
treatment works, water resources, air traffic control, airports, and municipal water supply 
in this category (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004). 
CIP in the 90’s 
In 1996,  President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010 categorizing critical 
infrastructure as “…so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating 
impact on the defense or economic security of the Unites States (Papa and Shenoi, 
2008).”   E.O. 13010 went further, by prioritizing particular infrastructure sectors, and 
specific assets within those sectors, on the basis of national importance (Moteff and 
Parfomak, 2004).   
 On this decade, concerns about terrorism lead to serious critical infrastructure 
efforts (Papa and Shenoi, 2008).  Reflecting new realities, a key development on this 
decade was the inclusion of the term “cyber” to the definition of critical infrastructures. 
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In 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-63 defines “critical” infrastructures as 
“those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the 
economy and government (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004).”   
CIP in the 2000’s 
Changes resulting from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 characterized 
this decade.  New government organizations were created, the definition of critical 
infrastructure was expanded and new efforts to share and collaborate across 
private/government sectors were launched.  
 In 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13228, establishing the Office of 
Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004). 
In 2002,  The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), in addition to 
identifying critical infrastructure, it also introduces the concept of “key assets” as a subset 
of nationally important key resources (Moteff and Parfomak, 2004). 
In 2003, The National Strategy for Physical Infrastructure Protection and Key 
Assets (NSPP) defines three categories of what it considers to be key assets:  
(1)  One category of key assets comprises the diverse array of national 
monuments, symbols, and icons that represent our Nation’s heritage, traditions and 
values, and political power.   
(2)  Another category of key assets includes facilities and structures that represent 
our national economic power and technological advancement.  
(3)  A third category of key assets includes such structures as prominent 
commercial centers, office buildings, and sports stadiums, where large numbers of people 
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regularly congregate to conduct business or personal transactions, shop, or enjoy a 
recreational pastime (Moteff and Parfomak 2004). 
On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 7 (HSPD-7) clarifying executive agency responsibilities for identifying, 
prioritizing and protecting critical infrastructure.  HSPD-7 specifies a list of 
infrastructures; however, it leaves open the possibility that the list could be expanded. 
(Moteff and Parfomak, 2004). 
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Appendix B:  DoD IA Definition of Information Systems Categories 
  -Automated Information System (AIS) Application: “An AIS application 
performs clearly defined functions for which there are readily identifiable security 
considerations and needs that are addressed as part of the acquisition. An AIS 
application may be a single software application (e.g.,  integrated Consumable Items 
Support (ICIS)); multiple software applications that are related to a single mission (e.g., 
payroll or personnel); or a combination of software and hardware performing a specific 
support function across a range of missions (e.g., Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS), Defense Messaging System (DMS)) (DoDI 8500.2, 2003). 
   - Enclave:  “Collection of computing environments connected by one or more 
internal networks under the control of a single authority and security policy, including 
personnel and physical security.  Examples of enclaves include local area networks and 
the applications they host, backbone networks, and data processing centers” (DoDI 
8500.2, 2003). 
  - Outsourced IT-based Process:  “For DoD IA purposes, an outsourced IT-based 
process is a general term used to refer to outsourced business processes supported by 
private sector information systems, outsourced information technologies, or outsourced 
information services. An outsourced IT-based process performs clearly defined functions 
for which there are readily identifiable security considerations and needs that are 
addressed in both acquisition and operations” (DoDI 8500.2, 2003). 
  - Platform IT Interconnection (PIT):   “For DoD IA purposes, platform IT 
interconnection refers to network access to platform IT. Platform IT interconnection has 
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readily identifiable security considerations and needs that must be addressed in both 
acquisition, and operations. Platform IT refers to computer resources, both hardware 
and software, that are physically part of, dedicated to, or essential in real time to the 
mission performance of special purpose systems such as weapons, training simulators, 
diagnostic test and maintenance equipment, calibration equipment, equipment used in the 
research and development of weapons systems, medical technologies, transport vehicles, 
buildings, and utility distribution systems such as water and electric”  (DoDI 8500.2, 
2003). 
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Appendix C:  Federal Government IA Documents (Abrams, 2007) 
The following US government documents help define the cyber security 
environment.  Regulations and guidance may not always be consistent. This list is not 
exhaustive. Other federal laws, regulations, and guidance not listed here may apply. 
Many organizations are governed by legislation that specifically applies to that 
organization (Abrams, 2007).  Note:  Attachment was compiled from MITRE Technical 
Report MTR070050. 
Federal Laws and Regulations 
• Public Law 107-347, Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 
December 17, 2002. 
• Public Law 107-296, Critical Information Infrastructure Act of 2002. 
• Public Law 104-106, Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. 
• Public Law 99-474, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 
• 5 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 552, “The Privacy Act of 1974.” 
• 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, “Coordination of Federal Information Policy.” 
• United States Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 29, Department of Homeland 
Security, “Procedures for Handling Critical Infrastructure Information.” 
Executive Orders 
• Executive Order 12472, Assignment of National Security and Emergency 
Preparedness 
Telecommunications Functions, April 3, 1984. 
• Executive Order 13011, Federal Information Technology, July 16, 1996. 
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• Executive Order 13231, Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age, 
October 16, 2001. 
• PDD-63, Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructures, May 22, 1998. 
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3), Homeland Security 
Advisory System, March 11, 2002. 
Office of Management and Budget 
• OMB Circular Number A-130, Management of Federal Information Resources, 
February 8, 1996. 
• OMB Circular Number A-123, Management Accountability and Control, revised 
June 21, 1999. 
• OMB Circular A-11, Preparation, Submission, Execution of Budgets, July 16, 2004. 
• OMB Memorandum M-00-10, Procedures and Guidelines on Implementing the 
Government Paperwork Elimination Act, April 25, 2002. 
• PDD 12, Security Awareness and Reporting of Foreign Contacts, August 5, 1993. 
• OMB Guide, Evaluating Information Technology Investments; 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infotech.html, February 2, 2006 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
• Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD), DHS Policy Directive 3, 
Homeland Security Advisory System, March 11, 2002. 
• HSPD, DHS Policy Directive 7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, 
Prioritization, and Protection, December 17, 2003. 
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• HSPD, DHS Policy Directive 12, Common Identification Standard for Federal 
Employees and Contractors, August 24, 2004. 
 
Department of Commerce (DOC) 
• FIPS 140-2, Security requirements for Cryptographic Modules, May 2001. 
• FIPS 180-2, Secure Hash Standard (SHS), August 2002, change notice February 
2004. 
• FIPS 186-2, Digital Signature Standard (DSS), January 2000. 
• FIPS 188, Standard Security Labels for Information Transfer, September 1994. 
• FIPS 190, Guideline for the Use of Advanced Authentication Technology 
Alternatives, September 1994 
• FIPS 198, The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC), March 2002. 
• FIPS 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and 
Information Systems, February 2004. 
• FIPS 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and 
Information Systems, March 2006. 
NIST 
•SP 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology Handbook, October 1995. 
• SP 800-13, Telecommunications Security Guidelines for Telecommunications 
Management Network, October 1995. 
• SP 800-14, Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Securing Information 
Technology Systems, September 1996. 
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• SP 800-15, Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC), 
Version 1, September 1997. 
• SP 800-16, Information Technology Security Training Requirements: A Roleand 
Performance-Based Model, April 1998. 
• SP 800-17, Modes of Operation Validation System (MOVS): Requirements and 
Procedures, February 1998. 
• SP 800-18, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Information Technology 
Systems, December 1998. 
• SP 800-19, Mobile Agent Security, October 1999. 
• SP 800-20, Modes of Operation Validation System for the Triple Data Encryption 
Algorithm (TDEA): Requirements and Procedures, October 1999, revised April 2000. 
• SP 800-21-1, Guideline for Implementing Cryptography in the Federal Government, 
Second edition, December 2005. 
• SP 800-22, A Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number 
Generators for Cryptographic Applications, October 2000, revised: May 15, 2001. 
• SP 800-23, Guideline to Federal Organizations on Security Assurance and 
Acquisition/Use of Tested/Evaluated Products, August 2000. 
• SP 800-24, PBX Vulnerability Analysis: Finding Holes in Your PBX Before 
Someone Else Does, August 2000. 
• SP 800-25, Federal Agency Use of Public Key Technology for Digital Signatures 
and Authentication, October 2000. 
• SP 800-26, Security Self-Assessment Guide for Information Technology Systems, 
November 2001. 
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• SP 800-27, Engineering Principles for Information Technology Security 
(A Baseline for Achieving Security), Revision A June 2004. 
•SP 800-29, A Comparison of the Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules 
in FIPS 140-1 and FIPS 140-2, June 2001. 
• SP 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, 
January 2002. 
• SP 800-31, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), November 2001. 
• SP 800-32, Introduction to Public Key Technology and the Federal PKI 
Infrastructure, February 2001. 
• SP 800-33, Underlying Technical Models for Information Technology Security, 
December 2001. 
• SP 800-34, Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems, 
June 2002. 
• SP 800-35, Guide to Information Technology Security Services, October 2003. 
• SP 800-36, Guide to Selecting Information Security Products, October 2003. 
• SP 800-37, Guide for Security Certification and Accreditation of Federal 
Information Systems, May 2004. 
• SP 800-38A, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation - Methods 
and Techniques, December 2001. 
• SP 800-38B, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC 
Mode for Authentication, May 2005. 
• SP 800-38C, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: the CCM 
Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality, May 2004. 
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• SP 800-38D, Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: 
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication, draft April 20, 
2006. 
• SP 800-40, Procedures for Handling Security Patches, September 2002. 
• SP 800-41, Guidelines on Firewalls and Firewall Policy, January 2002. 
• SP 800-42, Guideline on Network Security Testing, October 2003. 
• SP 800-43, Systems Administration Guidance for Windows 2000 Professional, 
November 2002. 
• SP 800-44, Guidelines on Securing Public Web Servers, September 2002. 
• NIST SP 800-45, Guidelines on Electronic Mail Security, September 2002. 
• SP 800-46, Security for Telecommuting and Broadband Communications, 
August 2002. 
•SP 800-47, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems, 
September 2002. 
• SP 800-48, Wireless Network Security 802.11, Bluetooth and Handheld Devices, 
November 2002. 
• SP 800-49, Federal S/MIME V3 Client Profile, November 2002. 
• SP 800-50, Building an Information Technology Security Awareness and Training 
Program, October 2003. 
• SP 800-51, Use of the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Vulnerability 
Naming Scheme, September 2002. 
• SP 800-52, Guidelines for the Selection and Use of Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) Implementations, June 2005. 
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• SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, 
February 2005. 
• SP 800-53A, Guide for Assessing the Security Controls in Federal Information 
Systems, draft May 4, 2006. 
• SP 800-54, Border Gateway Protocol Security, draft September 26, 2006. 
• SP 800-55, Security Metrics Guide for Information Technology Systems, July 2003. 
• SP 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using 
Discrete Logarithm Cryptography, March 2006. 
• SP 800-57, Recommendation on Key Management, August 2005. 
• SP 800-58, Security Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems, January 2005. 
• SP 800-59, Guidelines for Identifying an Information System as a National Security 
System, August 2003. 
• SP 800-60, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems 
to Security System, August 2003. 
• SP 800-61, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide, January 2004. 
• SP 800-63, Version 1.0.1, Electronic Authentication Guideline, September 2004. 
• SP 800-64, Security Considerations in the Information System Development Life 
Cycle, rev 1 June 2004. 
• SP 800-65, Integrating Security into the Capital Planning and Investment Control 
Process, January 2005. 
• SP 800-66, An Introductory Resource Guide for Implementing the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule, March 2005. 
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•SP 800-67, Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) 
Block Cipher, May 2004. 
• SP 800-68, Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Systems for IT 
Professionals: A NIST Security Configuration Checklist, October 2005. 
• SP 800-69, Guidance for Securing Microsoft Windows XP Home Edition: A NIST 
Security Configuration Checklist, September 2006. 
• SP 800-70, The NIST Security Configuration Checklists Program, May 2005. 
• SP 800-72, Guidelines on PDA Forensics, November 2004. 
• SP 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification, April 2005. 
• SP 800-76-1, Biometric Data Specification for Personal Identity Verification, 
draft September 14, 2006. 
• SP 800-77, Guide to IPSec VPNs, December 2005. 
• SP 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity 
Verification, April 2005. 
• SP 800-79, Guidelines for the Certification and Accreditation of PIV Card Issuing 
Organizations, July 2005. 
• SP 800-81, Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Deployment Guide, May 2006. 
• SP 800-82, Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) and 
Industrial Control System Security, draft September 2006. 
• SP 800-83, Guide to Malware Incident Prevention and Handling, November 2005. 
• SP 800-84, Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and 
Capabilities, September 2006. 
• SP 800-85A, PIV Card Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines 
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(SP800-73 compliance), April 2006. 
• SP 800-85B, PIV Data Model Conformance Test Guidelines, July 2006. 
• SP 800-86, Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response, 
August 2006. 
• SP 800-87, Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted 
Organizations, October 2005 (document updated January 17, 2006). 
• SP 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization, September 2006. 
• SP 800-89, Recommendation for Obtaining Assurances for Digital Signature 
Applications, November 2006. 
•SP 800-90, Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 
Random Bit Generators, June 2006. 
• SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log Management, September 2006. 
• SP 800-94, Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) Systems, draft 
August 31, 2006. 
• SP 800-95, Guide to Secure Web Services, draft August 31, 2006. 
• SP 800-96, PIV Card/Reader Interoperability Guidelines, September 2006. 
• SP 800-97, Guide to IEEE 802.11i: Robust Security Networks, draft June 5, 2006. 
• SP 800-98, Guidance for Securing Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Systems, 
draft September 26, 2006. 
• SP 800-100, Information Security Handbook: A Guide for Managers, October 2006. 
• SP 800-101, Guidelines on Cell Phone Forensics, draft August 31, 2006. 
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Appendix D: NIST SP 800-82 ICS Controls 
NIST SP 800-82 
6.1.1 Risk Assessment (Page 6-2) 
6.1.2 Planning ((Page 6-3) 
6.1.3 System and Service Acquisition (Page 6-4) 
6.1.4 Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (Page 6-5) 
6.2.1 Personnel Security (Page 6-7) 
6.2.2 Physical & Environmental Protection, (Page 6-7) 
6.2.2.1 Control Center/Control Room (Page 6-10) 
6.2.2.2 Portable Devices (Page 6-10) 
6.2.2.3 Cabling (Page 6-10) 
6.2.3 Contingency Planning (Page 6-11) 
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning  (Page 6-12) 
6.2.4 Configuration Management (Page 6-13) 
6.2.6 System and Information Integrity (Page 6-14) 
6.2.6.1 Malicious Code Detection (Page 6-15) 
6.2.6.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention (Page 6-15) 
6.2.6.3 Patch Management (Page 6-16) 
6.2.7 Media Protection (Page 6-18) 
6.2.8 Incident Response (Page 6-18) 
6.2.9 Awareness and Training (Page 6-21) 
6.3.1 Identification and Authentication (Page 6-22) 
6.3.1.1 Password Authentication (Page 6-23) 
6.3.1.3 Physical Token Authentication (Page 6-25) 
6.3.2.1 Role-Based Access Control (Page 6-27)  
6.3.2.2 Web Servers (Page 6-28) 
6.3.2.3 Virtual Local Area Network (Page 6-28) 
6.3.2.4 Dial-up Modems (Page 6-29) 
6.3.2.5 Wireless (Page 6-30) 
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6.3.3 Audit and Accountability (Page 6-31) 
6.3.4.1 Encryption (Page 6-33) 
6.3.4.2 Virtual Private Network (VPN) (Page 6-34) 
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Appendix E:  DoD IA Controls 
Control 
Number 
Control Name Subject Area DoD IA Control Description (DoD 8500.2) 
COAS-1 Alternate Site 
Designation 
Continuity An alternate site is identified that permits the 
partial restoration of mission or business essential 
functions. 
COAS-2 Alternate Site 
Designation 
Continuity An alternate site is identified that permits the 
restoration of all mission or business essential 
functions. 
COBR-1 Protection of 
Backup and 
Restoration 
Assets 
Continuity Procedures are in place assure the appropriate 
physical and technical protection of the backup 
and restoration hardware, firmware, and software, 
such as router tables, compilers, and other 
security-related system software. 
CODB-1 Data Backup 
Procedures 
Continuity Data backup is performed at least weekly. 
CODB-2 Data Backup 
Procedures 
Continuity Data backup is performed daily, and recovery 
media are stored off-site at a location that affords 
protection of the data in accordance with its 
mission assurance category and confidentiality 
level. 
CODB-3 Data Backup 
Procedures 
Continuity Data backup is accomplished by maintaining a 
redundant secondary system, not co-located, that 
can be activated without loss of data or disruption 
to the operation. 
CODP-1 Disaster and 
Recovery 
Planning 
Continuity A disaster plan exists that provides for the partial 
resumption of mission or business essential 
functions within 5 days of activation. (Disaster 
recovery procedures include business recovery 
plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster 
recovery plans, and plan acceptance.) 
CODP-2 Disaster and 
Recovery 
Planning 
Continuity A disaster plan exists that provides for the 
resumption of mission or business essential 
functions within 24 hours of activation. (Disaster 
recovery procedures include business recovery 
plans, system contingency plans, facility disaster 
recovery plans, and plan acceptance.) 
CODP-3 Disaster and 
Recovery 
Planning 
Continuity A disaster plan exists that provides for the smooth 
transfer of all mission or business essential 
functions to an alternate site for the duration of an 
event with little or no loss of operational continuity. 
(Disaster recovery procedures include business 
recovery plans, system contingency plans, facility 
disaster recovery plans, and plan acceptance.) 
COEB-1 Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Continuity Enclave boundary defense at the alternate site 
provides security measures equivalent to the 
primary site. 
COEB-2 Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Continuity Enclave boundary defense at the alternate site 
must be configured identically to that of the 
primary site. 
COED-1 Scheduled 
Exercises and 
Continuity The continuity of operations or disaster recovery 
plans are exercised annually. 
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Drills 
COED-2 Scheduled 
Exercises and 
Drills 
Continuity The continuity of operations or disaster recovery 
plans or significant portions are exercised semi-
annually. 
COEF-1 Identificatio
n of Essential 
Functions 
Continuity Mission and business essential functions are 
identified for priority restoration planning. 
COEF-2 Identification of 
Essential 
Functions 
Continuity Mission and business-essential functions are 
identified for priority restoration planning along 
with all assets supporting mission or business-
essential functions (e.g., computer-based 
services, data and applications, communications, 
physical infrastructure). 
COMS-
1 
Maintenance 
Support 
Continuity Maintenance support for key IT assets is available 
to respond within 24 hours of failure. 
COMS-
2 
Maintenance 
Support 
Continuity Maintenance support for key IT assets is available 
to respond 24 X 7 immediately upon failure. 
COPS-1 Power Supply Continuity Electrical power is restored to key IT assets by 
manually activated power generators upon loss of 
electrical power from the primary source. 
COPS-2 Power Supply Continuity Electrical systems are configured to allow 
continuous or uninterrupted power to key IT 
assets. This may include an uninterrupted power 
supply coupled with emergency generators. 
COPS-3 Power Supply Continuity Electrical systems are configured to allow 
continuous or uninterrupted power to key IT 
assets and all users accessing the key IT assets 
to perform mission or business-essential 
functions. This may include an uninterrupted 
power supply coupled with emergency generators 
or other alternate power source. 
COSP-1 Spares and 
Parts 
Continuity Maintenance spares and spare parts for key IT 
assets can be obtained within 24 hours of failure. 
COSP-2 Spares and 
Parts 
Continuity Maintenance spares and spare parts for key IT 
assets are available 24 X 7 immediately upon 
failure. 
COSW-
1 
Backup Copies 
of Critical SW 
Continuity Back-up copies of the operating system and other 
critical software are stored in a fire rated container 
or otherwise not collocated with the operational 
software. 
COTR-1 Trusted 
Recovery 
Continuity Recovery procedures and technical system 
features exist to ensure that recovery is done in a 
secure and verifiable manner. Circumstances that 
can inhibit a trusted recovery are documented and 
appropriate mitigating procedures have been put 
in place. 
DCAR-1 Procedural 
Review 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
An annual IA review is conducted that 
comprehensively evaluates existing policies and 
processes to ensure procedural consistency and 
to ensure that they fully support the goal of 
uninterrupted operations. 
DCAS-1 Acquisition 
Standards 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
The acquisition of all IA- and IA-enabled GOTS IT 
products is limited to products that have been 
evaluated by the NSA or in accordance with NSA-
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approved processes. The acquisition of all IA- and 
IA-enabled COTS IT products is limited to 
products that have been evaluated or validated 
through one of the following sources - the 
International Common Criteria (CC) for 
Information Security Technology Evaluation 
Mutual Recognition Arrangement, the NIAP 
Evaluation and Validation Program, or the FIPS 
validation program. Robustness requirements, the 
mission, and customer needs will enable an 
experienced information systems security 
engineer to recommend a Protection Profile, a 
particular evaluated product or a security target 
with the appropriate assurance requirements for a 
product to be submitted for evaluation (See also 
DCSR-1). 
DCBP-1 Best Security 
Practices 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
The DoD information system security design 
incorporates best security practices such as single 
sign-on, PKE, smart card, and biometrics. 
DCCB-1 Control Board Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
All DoD information systems are under the control 
of a chartered configuration control board that 
meets regularly according to DCPR-1. 
DCCB-2 Control  Board Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
All information systems are under the control of a 
chartered Configuration Control Board that meets 
regularly according to DCPR-1. The IAM is a 
 voting member of the CCB. 
DCCS-1 Configuration 
Specifications 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A DoD reference document, such as a security 
technical implementation guide or security 
recommendation guide constitutes the primary 
source for security configuration or implementation 
guidance for the deployment of newly acquired IA- 
and IA-enabled IT products that require use of the 
product's IA capabilities. If a DoD reference 
document is not available, the following are 
acceptable in descending order as available: (1) 
Commercially accepted practices (e.g., SANS); (2) 
Independent testing results (e.g., ICSA); or (3) 
Vendor literature. 
DCCS-2 Configuration 
Specifications 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A DoD reference document such as a security 
technical implementation guide or security 
recommendation guide constitutes the primary 
source for security configuration or implementation 
guidance for the deployment of newly acquired IA- 
and IA-enabled IT products that require use of the 
product's IA capabilities. If a DoD reference 
document is not available, the system owner 
works with DISA or NSA to draft configuration 
guidance for inclusion in a Departmental reference 
guide. 
DCCT-1 Compliance 
Testing 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A comprehensive set of procedures is 
implemented that tests all patches, upgrades, and 
new AIS applications prior to deployment. 
DCDS-1 Dedicated IA 
Services 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
Acquisition or outsourcing of dedicated IA 
services such as incident monitoring, analysis and 
response; operation of IA devices such as 
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firewalls; or key management services are 
supported by a formal risk analysis and approved 
by the DoD Component CIO. 
DCFA-1 Functional 
Architecture for 
AIS Applications 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
For AIS applications, a functional architecture 
that identifies the following has been developed 
and is maintained: - all external interfaces, the 
information being exchanged, and the protection 
mechanisms associated with each interface - user 
roles required for access control and the access 
privileges assigned to each role (See ECAN) - 
unique security requirements (e.g., encryption of 
key data elements at rest) - categories of sensitive 
information processed or stored by the AIS 
application, and their specific protection plans 
(e.g., Privacy Act, HIPAA) - restoration priority of 
subsystems, processes, or information (See 
COEF). 
DCHW-
1 
HW Baseline Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A current and comprehensive baseline inventory 
of all hardware (HW) (to include manufacturer, 
type, model, physical location and network 
topology or architecture) required to support 
enclave operations is maintained by the 
Configuration Control Board (CCB) and as part of 
the SSAA. A backup copy of the inventory is 
stored in a fire-rated container or otherwise not 
collocated with the original. 
DCID-1 Interconnection 
Documentation 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
For AIS applications, a list of all (potential) hosting 
enclaves is developed and maintained along with 
evidence of deployment planning and coordination 
and the exchange of connection rules and 
requirements. For enclaves, a list of all hosted AIS 
applications, interconnected outsourced IT-based 
processes, and interconnected IT platforms is 
developed and maintained along with evidence of 
deployment planning and coordination and the 
exchange of connection rules and requirements. 
DCII-1 IA Impact 
Assessment 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
Changes to the DoD information system are 
assessed for IA and accreditation impact prior to 
implementation. 
DCIT-1 IA for IT 
Services 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
Acquisition or outsourcing of IT services explicitly 
addresses Government, service provider, and end 
user IA roles and responsibilities. 
DCMC-
1 
Mobile Code Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
The acquisition, development, and/or use of 
mobile code to be deployed in DoD systems 
meets the following requirements: 
1. Emerging mobile code technologies that have 
not undergone a risk assessment by NSA and 
been assigned to a Risk Category by the DoD CIO 
is not used. 
2. Category 1 mobile code is signed with a DoD-
approved PKI code signing certificate; use of 
unsigned Category 1 mobile code is prohibited; 
use of Category 1 mobile code technologies that 
cannot block or disable unsigned mobile code 
(e.g., Windows Scripting Host) is prohibited. 
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3. Category 2 mobile code, which executes in a 
constrained environment without access to system 
resources (e.g., Windows registry, file system, 
system parameters, network connections to other 
than the originating host) may be used. 
4. Category 2 mobile code that does not execute 
in a constrained environment may be used when 
obtained from a trusted source over an assured 
channel (e.g., SIPRNET, SSL connection, 
S/MIME, code is signed with a DoD-approved 
code signing certificate). 
5. Category 3 mobile code may be used. 
6. All DoD workstation and host software are 
configured, to the extent possible, to prevent the 
download and execution of mobile code that is 
prohibited. 
7. The automatic execution of all mobile code in 
email is prohibited; email software is configured to 
prompt the user prior to executing mobile code in 
attachments. 
DCNR-1 Non-repudiation Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
NIST FIPS 140-2 validated cryptography (e.g., 
DoD PKI class 3 or 4 token) is used to implement 
encryption (e.g., AES, 3DES, DES, Skipjack), key 
exchange (e.g., FIPS 171), digital signature (e.g., 
DSA, RSA, ECDSA), and hash (e.g., SHA-1, SHA-
256, SHA-384, SHA-512). Newer standards 
should be applied as they become available. 
DCPA-1 Partitioning the 
Application 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
User interface services (e.g., web services) 
are physically or logically separated from data 
storage and management services (e.g., database 
management systems). Separation may be 
accomplished through the use of different 
computers, different CPUs, different instances of 
the operating system, different network addresses, 
combinations of these methods, or other methods, 
as appropriate. 
DCPB-1 IA Program and 
Budget 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A discrete line item for Information Assurance is 
established in programming and budget 
documentation. 
DCPD-1 Public Domain 
Software 
Controls 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
Binary or machine executable public domain 
software products and other software products 
with limited or no warranty such as those 
commonly known as freeware or shareware are 
not used in DoD information systems unless they 
are necessary for mission accomplishment and 
there are no alternative IT solutions available. 
Such products are assessed for information 
assurance impacts, and approved for use by the 
DAA. The assessment addresses the fact that 
such software products are difficult or impossible 
to review, repair, or extend, given that the 
Government does not have access to the original 
source code and there is no owner who could 
make such repairs on behalf of the Government. 
DCPP-1 Ports, Protocols, Security DoD information systems comply with DoD ports, 
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and Services Design and 
Configuration 
protocols, and services guidance. AIS 
applications, outsourced IT-based processes and 
platform IT identify the network ports, protocols, 
and services they plan to use as early in the life 
cycle as possible and notify hosting enclaves. 
Enclaves register all active ports, protocols, and 
services in accordance with DoD and DoD 
Component guidance. 
DCPR-1 CM Process Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A configuration management (CM) process is 
implemented that includes requirements for: 
1. Formally documented CM roles, responsibilities, 
and procedures to include the management of IA 
information and documentation; 
2. A configuration control board that implements 
procedures to ensure a security review and 
approval of all proposed DoD information system 
changes, to include interconnections to other DoD 
information systems; 
3. A testing process to verify proposed 
configuration changes prior to implementation in 
the operational environment; and 
4. A verification process to provide additional 
assurance that the CM process is working 
effectively and that changes outside the CM 
process are technically or procedurally not 
permitted. 
DCSD-1 IA 
Documentation 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
All appointments to required IA roles (e.g., 
DAA and IAM/IAO) are established in writing, to 
include assigned duties and appointment criteria 
such as training, security clearance, and IT-
designation. A System Security Plan is 
established that describes the technical, 
administrative, and procedural IA program and 
policies that govern the DoD information system, 
and identifies all IA personnel and specific IA 
requirements and objectives (e.g., requirements 
for data handling or dissemination, system 
redundancy and backup or emergency response). 
DCSL-1 System Library 
Management 
Controls 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
System libraries are managed and maintained to 
protect privileged programs and to prevent or 
minimize the introduction of unauthorized code. 
DCSP-1 Security 
Support 
Structure 
Partitioning 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
The security support structure is isolated by 
means of partitions, domains, etc., including 
control of access to, and integrity of, hardware, 
software, and firmware that perform security 
functions. The security support structure maintains 
separate execution domains (e.g., address 
spaces) for each executing process. 
DCSQ-1 Software Quality Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
Software quality requirements and validation 
methods that are focused on the minimization of 
flawed or malformed software that can negatively 
impact integrity or availability (e.g., buffer 
overruns) are specified for all software 
development initiatives. 
DCSR-1 Specified Security At a minimum, basic-robustness COTS IA and IA-
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Robustness - 
Basic 
Design and 
Configuration 
enabled products are used to protect publicly 
released information from malicious tampering or 
destruction and ensure its availability. The basic-
robustness requirements for products are defined 
in the Protection Profile Consistency Guidance for 
Basic Robustness published under the IATF. 
DCSR-2 Specified 
Robustness - 
Medium 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
At a minimum, medium-robustness COTS IA and 
IA-enabled products are used to protect sensitive 
information when the information transits public 
networks or the system handling the information is 
accessible by individuals who are not authorized 
to access the information on the system. The 
medium-robustness requirements for products are 
defined in the Protection Profile Consistency 
Guidance for Medium Robustness published 
under the IATF.  COTS IA and IA-enabled IT 
products used for access control, data separation, 
or privacy on sensitive systems already protected 
by approved medium-robustness products, at a 
minimum, satisfy the requirements for basic 
robustness. If these COTS IA and IA-enabled IT 
products are used to protect National Security 
Information by cryptographic means, NSA-
approved key management may be required. 
DCSR-3 Specified 
Robustness – 
High 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
Only high-robustness GOTS or COTS IA and IA-
enabled IT products are used to protect classified 
information when the information transits networks 
that are at a lower classification level than the 
information being transported. High-robustness 
products have been evaluated by NSA or in 
accordance with NSA-approved processes. COTS 
IA and IA-enabled IT products used for access 
control, data separation or privacy on classified 
systems already protected by approved high-
robustness products at a minimum, satisfy the 
requirements for basic robustness. If these COTS 
IA and IA-enabled IT products are used to protect 
National Security Information by cryptographic 
means, NSA-approved key management may be 
required. 
DCSS-1 System State 
Changes 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
System initialization, shutdown, and aborts are 
configured to ensure that the system remains in a 
secure state. 
DCSS-2 System State 
Changes 
Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
System initialization, shutdown, and aborts are 
configured to ensure that the system remains in a 
secure state. Tests are provided and periodically 
run to ensure the integrity of the system state. 
DCSW-
1 
SW Baseline Security 
Design and 
Configuration 
A current and comprehensive baseline inventory 
of all software (SW) (to include manufacturer, 
type, and version and installation manuals and 
procedures) required to support DoD information 
system operations is maintained by the CCB and 
as part of the C&A documentation. A backup copy 
of the inventory is stored in a fire-rated container 
or otherwise not collocated with the original. 
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EBBD-1 Boundary 
Defense 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Boundary defense mechanisms to include 
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the 
wide area network, and Internet access is 
permitted from a demilitarized zone (DMZ) that 
meets the DoD requirement that such contacts are 
isolated from other DoD systems by physical or 
technical means. All Internet access points are 
under the management and control of the enclave. 
Internet access is permitted from a demilitarized 
zone (DMZ) that meets the DoD requirement that 
such contacts are isolated from other DoD 
systems by physical or technical means. All 
Internet access points are under the management 
and control of the enclave. 
EBBD-2 Boundary 
Defense 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Boundary defense mechanisms, to include 
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the 
wide area network, at layered or internal enclave 
boundaries, or at key points in the network, as 
required.  All Internet access is proxied through 
Internet access points that are under the 
management and control of the enclave and are 
isolated from other DoD information systems by 
physical or technical means. 
EBBD-3 Boundary 
Defense 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Boundary defense mechanisms to include 
firewalls and network intrusion detection systems 
(IDS) are deployed at the enclave boundary to the 
wide area network, and at layered or internal 
enclave boundaries and key points in the network 
as required. All Internet access is prohibited. 
EBCR-1 Connection 
Rules 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
The DoD information system is compliant with 
established DoD connection rules and approval 
processes. 
EBPW-
1 
Public WAN 
Connection 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Connections between DoD enclaves and the 
Internet or other public or commercial wide area 
networks require a demilitarized zone (DMZ). 
EBRP-1 Remote Access 
for Privileged 
Functions 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
Remote access for privileged functions is 
discouraged, is permitted only for compelling 
operational needs, and is strictly controlled. In 
addition to EBRU-1, sessions employ security 
measures such as a VPN with blocking mode 
enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote 
session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the 
log for every remote session. 
EBRU-1 Remote Access 
for User 
Functions 
Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
All remote access to DoD information systems, to 
include telework access, is mediated through a 
managed access control point, such as a remote 
access server in a DMZ. Remote access always 
uses encryption to protect the confidentiality of the 
session. The session-level encryption equals or 
exceeds the robustness established in ECCT. 
Authenticators are restricted to those that offer 
strong protection against spoofing. Information 
regarding remote access mechanisms (e.g., 
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Internet address, dial-up connection telephone 
number) is protected. 
EBVC-1 VPN Controls Enclave 
Boundary 
Defense 
All VPN traffic is visible to network intrusion 
detection systems (IDS). 
ECAD-1 Affiliation 
Display 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
To help prevent inadvertent disclosure of 
controlled information, all contractors are identified 
by the inclusion of the abbreviation "ctr" and all 
foreign nationals are identified by the inclusion of 
their two character country code in: - DoD user e-
mail addresses (e.g., john.smith.ctr@army.mil 
orjohn.smith.uk@army.mil); - DoD user e-mail 
display names (e.g., John Smith, Contractor 
<john.smith.ctr@army.mil> or John Smith, United 
Kingdom <john.smith.uk@army.mil>); and - 
automated signature blocks (e.g., John Smith, 
Contractor, J-6K, Joint Staff or John Doe, 
Australia, LNO, Combatant Command). 
Contractors who are also foreign nationals are 
identified as both 
(e.g.,john.smith.ctr.uk@army.mil). Country codes 
and guidance regarding their use are in FIPS 10-
4. 
ECAN-1 Access for 
Need-to-Know 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Access to all DoD information (classified, 
sensitive, and public) is determined by both its 
classification and user need-to-know. Need-to-
know is established by the Information Owner and 
enforced by discretionary or role-based access 
controls. Access controls are established and 
enforced for all shared or networked file systems 
and internal websites, whether classified, 
sensitive, or unclassified. All internal classified, 
sensitive, and unclassified websites are organized 
to provide at least three distinct levels of access: 
1. Open access to general information that is 
made available to all DoD authorized users with 
network access. Access does not require an audit 
transaction. 
2. Controlled access to information that is made 
available to all DoD authorized users upon the 
presentation of an individual authenticator. Access 
is recorded in an audit transaction. 
ECAR-1 Audit Record 
Content – Public 
Systems 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Audit records include: 
  · User ID. 
  · Successful and unsuccessful attempts to 
access security files. 
  · Date and time of the event. 
  · Type of event.    
ECAR-2 Audit Record 
Content – 
Sensitive 
Systems 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Audit records include: 
  · User ID. 
  · Successful and unsuccessful attempts to 
access security files. 
  · Date and time of the event. 
  · Type of event. 
  · Success or failure of event. 
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  · Successful and unsuccessful logons. 
  · Denial of access resulting from excessive 
number of logon attempts. 
  · Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or 
access port and the reason for the action. 
  · Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate 
safeguards controlled by the system. 
ECAR-3 Audit Record 
Content – 
Classified 
Systems 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Audit records include: 
  · User ID. 
  · Successful and unsuccessful attempts to 
access security files. 
  · Date and time of the event. 
  · Type of event. 
  · Success or failure of event. 
  · Successful and unsuccessful logons. 
  · Denial of access resulting from excessive 
number of logon attempts. 
  · Blocking or blacklisting a user ID, terminal or 
access port, and the reason for the action. 
  · Activities that might modify, bypass, or negate 
safeguards controlled by the system. 
  · Data required auditing the possible use of 
covert channel mechanisms. 
  · Privileged activities and other system-level 
access. 
  · Starting and ending time for access to the 
system. 
  · Security relevant actions associated with 
periods processing or the changing of security 
labels or categories of information. 
ECAT-1 Audit Trail, 
Monitoring, 
Analysis and 
Reporting 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Audit trail records from all available sources are 
regularly reviewed for indications of inappropriate 
or unusual activity. Suspected violations of IA 
policies are analyzed and reported in accordance 
with DoD information system IA procedures. 
ECAT-2 Audit Trail, 
Monitoring, 
Analysis and 
Reporting 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
An automated, continuous on-line monitoring and 
audit trail creation capability is deployed with the 
capability to immediately alert personnel of any 
unusual or inappropriate activity with potential IA 
implications, and with a user configurable 
capability to automatically disable the system if 
serious IA violations are detected. 
ECCD-1 Changes to 
Data 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Access control mechanisms exist to ensure that 
data is accessed and changed only by authorized 
personnel. 
ECCD-2 Changes to 
Data 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Access control mechanisms exist to ensure that 
data is accessed and changed only by authorized 
personnel. Access and changes to the data are 
recorded in transaction logs that are reviewed 
periodically or immediately upon system security 
events. Users are notified of time and date of the 
last change in data content. 
ECCM-
1 
COMSEC Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
COMSEC activities comply with DoD Directive C-
5200.5. 
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ECCR-1 Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at Rest) 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
If required by the information owner, NIST-certified 
cryptography is used to encrypt stored sensitive 
information. 
ECCR-2 Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at Rest) 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
If required by the information owner, NIST-certified 
cryptography is used to encrypt stored classified 
non-SAMI information. 
ECCR-3 Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at Rest) 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
If a classified enclave contains SAMI and is 
accessed by individuals lacking an appropriate 
clearance for SAMI, then NSA-approved 
cryptography is used to encrypt all SAMI stored 
within the enclave. 
ECCT-1 Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at 
Transmit) 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Enclave Computing Environment 
ECCT-2 Encryption for 
Confidentiality 
(Data at 
Transmit) 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Classified data transmitted through a network that 
is cleared to a lower level than the data being 
transmitted are separately encrypted using NSA-
approved cryptography (See also DCSR-3). 
ECDC-1 Data Change 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Transaction-based systems (e.g., database 
management systems, transaction processing 
systems) implement transaction roll-back and 
transaction journaling, or technical equivalents. 
ECIC-1 Interconnections 
among DoD 
Systems and 
Enclaves 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Discretionary access controls are a sufficient IA 
mechanism for connecting DoD information 
systems operating at the same classification, but 
with different need-to-know access rules. A 
controlled interface is required for interconnections 
among DoD information systems operating at 
different classifications levels or between DoD and 
non-DoD systems or networks. Controlled 
interfaces are addressed in separate guidance. 
ECID-1 Host Based IDS Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Host-based intrusion detection systems are 
deployed for major applications and for network 
management assets, such as routers, switches, 
and domain name servers (DNS). 
ECIM-1 Instant 
Messaging 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Instant messaging traffic to and from instant 
messaging clients that are independently 
configured by end users and that interact with a 
public service provider is prohibited within DoD 
information systems. Both inbound and outbound 
public service instant messaging traffic is blocked 
at the enclave boundary. Note: This does not 
include IM services that are configured by a DoD 
AIS application or enclave to perform an 
authorized and official function. 
ECLC-1 Audit of Security 
Label Changes 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
The system automatically records the creation, 
deletion, or modification of confidentiality or 
integrity labels, if required by the information 
owner. 
ECLO-1 Logon Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Successive logon attempts are controlled using 
one or more of the following: 
  · Access is denied after multiple unsuccessful 
logon attempts. 
  · The number of access attempts in a given 
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period is limited. 
  · A time-delay control system is employed. If the 
system allows for multiple logon sessions for each 
user ID, the system provides a capability to control 
the number of logon sessions. 
ECLO-2 Logon Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Successive logon attempts are controlled 
using one or more of the following: 
  · Access is denied after multiple unsuccessful 
logon attempts. 
  · The number of access attempts in a given 
period is limited. 
  · A time-delay control system is employed. If the 
system allows for multiple logon sessions for each 
user ID, the system provides a capability to control 
the number of logon sessions. Upon successful 
logon, the user is notified of the date and time of 
the user's last logon, the location of the user at 
last logon, and the number of unsuccessful logon 
attempts using this user ID since the last 
successful logon. 
ECLP-1 Least Privilege Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Access procedures enforce the principles of 
separation of duties and "least privilege."  Access 
to privileged accounts is limited to privileged 
users. Use of privileged accounts is limited to 
privileged functions; that is, privileged users use 
non-privileged accounts for all non-privileged 
functions. This control is in addition to an 
appropriate security clearance and need-to-know 
authorization. 
ECML-1 Marking and 
Labeling 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Information and DoD information systems that 
store, process, transit, or display data in any form 
or format that is not approved for public release 
comply with all requirements for marking and 
labeling contained in policy and guidance 
documents such as DoD 5200.1R. Markings and 
labels clearly reflect the classification or sensitivity 
level, if applicable, and any special dissemination, 
handling, or distribution instructions. 
ECMT-1 Conformance 
Monitoring and 
Testing 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Conformance testing that includes periodic, 
unannounced in-depth monitoring and provides for 
specific penetration testing to ensure compliance 
with all vulnerability mitigation procedures such as 
the DoD IAVA or other DoD IA practices is 
planned, scheduled, and conducted. Testing is 
intended to ensure that the system's IA 
capabilities continue to provide adequate 
assurance against constantly evolving threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
ECMT-2 Conformance 
Monitoring and 
Testing 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Conformance testing that includes periodic, 
unannounced in-depth monitoring and provides for 
specific penetration testing to ensure compliance 
with all vulnerability mitigation procedures such as 
the DoD IAVA or other DoD IA practices is 
planned, scheduled, conducted, and 
independently validated. Testing is intended to 
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ensure that the system's IA capabilities continue to 
provide adequate assurance against constantly 
evolving threats and vulnerabilities. 
ECND-1 Network Device 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
An effective network device control program (e.g., 
routers, switches, firewalls) is implemented and 
includes: instructions for restart and recovery 
procedures; restrictions on source code access, 
system utility access, and system documentation; 
protection from deletion of system and application 
files, and a structured process for implementation 
of directed solutions (e.g., IAVA). 
ECND-2 Network Device 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
An effective network device control program (e.g., 
routers, switches, firewalls) is implemented and 
includes: instructions for restart and recovery 
procedures; restrictions on source code access, 
system utility access, and system documentation; 
protection from deletion of system and application 
files, and a structured process for implementation 
of directed solutions (e.g., IAVA). Audit or other 
technical measures are in place to ensure that the 
network device controls are not compromised. 
Change controls are periodically tested. 
ECNK-1 Encryption for 
Need-To-Know 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Information in transit through a network at the 
same classification level, but which must be 
separated for need-to-know reasons, is encrypted, 
at a minimum, with NIST-certified cryptography. 
This is in addition to ECCT (encryption for 
confidentiality – data in transit). 
ECNK-2 Encryption for 
Need-To-Know 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
SAMI information in transit through a network at 
the same classification level is encrypted using 
NSA-approved cryptography. This is to separate it 
for need-to-know reasons. This is in addition to 
ECCT (encryption for confidentiality – data in 
transit). 
ECPA-1 Privileged 
Account Control 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
All privileged user accounts are established and 
administered in accordance with a role-based 
access scheme that organizes all system and 
network privileges into roles (e.g., key 
management, network, system administration, 
database administration, web-administration). The 
IAM tracks privileged role assignments. 
ECPC-1 Production 
Code Change 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Application programmer privileges to change 
production code and data are limited and are 
periodically reviewed. 
ECPC-2 Production 
Code Change 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Application programmer privileges to change 
production code and data are limited and reviewed 
every 3 months. 
ECRC-1 Resource 
Control 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
All authorizations to the information contained 
within an object are revoked prior to initial 
assignment, allocation, or reallocation to a subject 
from the system's pool of unused objects. No 
information, including encrypted representations of 
information, produced by a prior subject's actions 
is available to any subject that obtains access to 
an object that has been released back to the 
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system. There is absolutely no residual data from 
the former object. 
ECRG-1 Audit Reduction 
and Report 
Generation 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Tools are available for the review of audit records 
and for report generation from audit records. 
ECRR-1 Audit Record 
Retention 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
If the DoD information system contains sources 
and methods intelligence (SAMI), then audit 
records are retained for 5 years. Otherwise, audit 
records are retained for at least 1 year. 
ECSC-1 Security 
Configuration 
Compliance 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
For Enclaves and AIS applications, all DoD 
security configuration or implementation guides 
have been applied. 
ECSD-1 Software 
Development 
Change 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Change controls for software development are in 
place to prevent unauthorized programs or 
modifications to programs from being 
implemented. 
ECSD-2 Software 
Development 
Change 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Change controls for software development are in 
place to prevent unauthorized programs or 
modifications to programs from being 
implemented. Change controls include review and 
approval of application change requests and 
technical system features to assure that changes 
are executed by authorized personnel and are 
properly implemented. 
ECTB-1 Audit Trail 
Backup 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
The audit records are backed up not less than 
weekly onto a different system or media than the 
system being audited. 
ECTC-1 Tempest 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Measures to protect against compromising 
emanations have been implemented according to 
DoD Directive S-5200.19. 
ECTM-1 Transmission 
Integrity 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Good engineering practices with regards to the 
integrity mechanisms of COTS, GOTS and custom 
developed solutions are implemented for incoming 
and outgoing files, such as parity checks and 
cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs). 
ECTM-2 Transmission 
Integrity 
Controls 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Good engineering practices with regards to the 
integrity mechanisms of COTS, GOTS, and 
custom developed solutions are implemented for 
incoming and outgoing files, such as parity checks 
and cyclic redundancy checks (CRCs). 
Mechanisms are in place to assure the integrity of 
all transmitted information (including labels and 
security parameters) and to detect or prevent the 
hijacking of a communication session (e.g., 
encrypted or covert communication channels). 
ECTP-1 Audit Trail 
Protection 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
The contents of audit trails are protected against 
unauthorized access, modification or deletion. 
ECVI-1 Voice-over-IP 
(VoIP) 
Protection 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) traffic to and 
from workstation IP telephony clients that are 
independently configured by end users for 
personal use is prohibited within DoD information 
systems. Both inbound and outbound individually 
configured voice over IP traffic is blocked at the 
enclave boundary. Note: This does not include 
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VoIP services that are configured by a DoD AIS 
application or enclave to perform an authorized 
and official function. 
ECVP-1 Virus Protection Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
All Servers, workstations and mobile computing 
devices (i.e. laptop, PDAs) implement virus 
protection that includes a capability for automatic 
updates. 
ECWM-
1 
Warning 
Message 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
All users are warned that they are entering a 
Government information system, and are provided 
with appropriate privacy and security notices to 
include statements informing them that they are 
subject to monitoring, recording and auditing. 
ECWN-
1 
Wireless 
Computing and 
Network 
Enclave 
Computing 
Environment 
Wireless computing and networking capabilities 
from workstations, laptops, personal digital 
assistants (PDAs), handheld computers, cellular 
phones, or other portable electronic devices are 
implemented in accordance with DoD wireless 
policy, as issued. (See also ECCT). Unused 
wireless computing capabilities internally 
embedded in interconnected DoD IT assets are 
normally disabled by changing factory defaults, 
settings or configurations prior to issue to end 
users. Wireless computing and networking 
capabilities are not independently configured by 
end users. 
IAAC-1 Account Control Identification 
and 
Authentication 
A comprehensive account management process is 
implemented to ensure that only authorized users 
can gain access to workstations, applications, and 
networks and that individual accounts designated 
as inactive, suspended, or terminated are 
promptly deactivated. 
IAGA-1 Group 
Authentication 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Group authenticators for application or network 
access may be used only in conjunction with an 
individual authenticator. Any use of group 
authenticators not based on the DoD PKI has 
been explicitly approved by the Designated 
Approving Authority (DAA). 
IAIA-1 Individual 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
DoD information system access is gained through 
the presentation of an individual identifier (e.g., a 
unique token or user login ID) and password. For 
systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual 
identifier, passwords are, at a minimum, a case 
sensitive 8-character mix of upper case letters, 
lower case letters, numbers, and special 
characters, including at least one of each (e.g., 
emPagd2!). At least four characters must be 
changed when a new password is created. 
Deployed/tactical systems with limited data input 
capabilities implement the password to the extent 
possible. 
Registration to receive a user ID and password 
includes authorization by a supervisor, and is 
done in person before a designated registration 
authority. Additionally, to the extent system 
capabilities permit, system mechanisms are 
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implemented to enforce automatic expiration of 
passwords and to prevent password reuse. All 
factory set, default or standard-user IDs and 
passwords are removed or changed. 
Authenticators 
are protected commensurate with the 
classification or sensitivity of the information 
accessed; they are not shared; and they are not 
embedded in access scripts or stored on function 
keys. Passwords are encrypted both for storage 
and for transmission. 
IAIA-2 Individual 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
DoD information system access is gained through 
the presentation of an individual identifier (e.g., a 
unique token or user logon ID) and password. For 
systems utilizing a logon ID as the individual 
identifier, passwords are, at a minimum, a case 
sensitive, 8-character mix of upper case letters, 
lower case letters, numbers, and special 
characters, including at least one of each (e.g., 
emPagd2!). At least four characters must be 
changed when a new password is created. 
Deployed/tactical systems with limited data input 
capabilities implement these measures to the 
extent possible. Registration to receive a user ID 
and password includes authorization by a 
supervisor, and is done in person before a 
designated registration authority. Multiple forms of 
certification of individual identification such as a 
documentary evidence or a combination of 
documents and biometrics are presented to the 
registration authority.  Additionally, to the extent 
capabilities permit, system mechanisms are 
implemented to enforce automatic expiration of 
passwords and to prevent password reuse, and 
processes are in place to validate that passwords 
are sufficiently strong to resist cracking and other 
attacks intended to discover a user's password). 
All factory set, default or standard-user IDs and 
passwords are removed or changed. 
Authenticators are protected commensurate with 
the classification or sensitivity of the information 
accessed; they are not shared; and they are not 
embedded in access scripts or stored on function 
keys. Passwords are encrypted both for storage 
and for transmission. 
IAKM-1 Key 
Management 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Symmetric Keys are produced, controlled, and 
distributed using NIST-approved key management 
technology and processes. Asymmetric Keys are 
produced, controlled, and distributed using DoD 
PKI Class 3 certificates or pre-placed keying 
material. 
IAKM-2 Key 
Management 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Symmetric Keys are produced, controlled and 
distributed using NSA-approved key management 
technology and processes. Asymmetric Keys are 
produced, controlled, and distributed using DoD 
 
100 
 
PKI Medium Assurance or High Assurance 
 certificates and hardware security tokens that 
protect the user's private key. 
IAKM-3 Key 
Management 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Symmetric and asymmetric keys are produced, 
controlled and distributed using NSA-approved 
key management technology and processes. 
IATS-1 Token and 
Certificate 
Standards 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Identification and authentication is accomplished 
using the DoD PKI Class 3 certificate and 
hardware security token (when available). 
IATS-2 Token and 
Certificate 
Standards 
Identification 
and 
Authentication 
Identification and authentication is accomplished 
using the DoD PKI Class 3 or 4 certificate and 
hardware security token (when available) or an 
NSA-certified product. 
PECF-1 Access to 
Computing 
Facilities 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Only authorized personnel with a need-to-know 
are granted physical access to computing facilities 
that process sensitive information or unclassified 
information that has not been cleared for release. 
PECF-2 Access to 
Computing 
Facilities 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Only authorized personnel with appropriate 
clearances are granted physical access to 
computing facilities that process classified 
information. 
PECS-1 Clearing and 
Sanitizing 
Physical and 
Environmental 
All documents, equipment, and machine-readable 
media containing sensitive data are cleared and 
sanitized before being released outside of the 
Department of Defense according to DoD 5200.1-
R and ASD(C3I) Memorandum, dated June 4, 
2001, subject: "Disposition of Unclassified DoD 
Computer Hard Drives." 
PECS-2 Clearing and 
Sanitizing 
Physical and 
Environmental 
All documents, equipment, and machine-readable 
media containing classified data are cleared and 
sanitized before being released outside its security 
domain according to DoD 5200.1-R. 
PEDD-1 Destruction Physical and 
Environmental 
All documents, machine-readable media, and 
equipment are destroyed using procedures that 
comply with DoD policy (e.g., DoD 5200.1-R). 
PEDI-1 Data 
Interception 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Devices that display or output classified or 
sensitive information in human-readable form are 
positioned to deter unauthorized individuals from 
reading the information. 
PEEL-1 Emergency 
Lighting 
Physical and 
Environmental 
An automatic emergency lighting system is 
installed that covers emergency exits and 
evacuation routes. 
PEEL-2 Emergency 
Lighting 
Physical and 
Environmental 
An automatic emergency lighting system is 
installed that covers all areas necessary to 
maintain mission or business essential functions, 
to include emergency exits and evacuation routes. 
PEFD-1 Fire Detection Physical and 
Environmental 
Battery-operated or electric stand-alone smoke 
detectors are installed in the facility. 
PEFD-2 Fire Detection Physical and 
Environmental 
A servicing fire department receives an automatic 
notification of any activation of the smoke 
detection or fire suppression system. 
PEFI-1 Fire Inspection Physical and 
Environmental 
Computing facilities undergo a periodic fire 
marshal inspection. Deficiencies are promptly 
resolved. 
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PEFS-1 Fire 
Suppression 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Handheld fire extinguishers or fixed fire hoses are 
available should an alarm be sounded or a fire be 
detected. 
PEFS-2 Fire 
Suppression 
Physical and 
Environmental 
A fully automatic fire suppression system is 
installed that automatically activates when it 
detects heat, smoke, or particles. 
PEHC-1 Humidity 
Controls 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Humidity controls are installed that provide an 
alarm of fluctuations potentially harmful to 
personnel or equipment operation; adjustments to 
humidifier/de-humidifier systems may be made 
manually. 
PEHC-2 Humidity 
Controls 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Automatic humidity controls are installed to 
prevent humidity fluctuations potentially harmful to 
personnel or equipment operation. 
PEMS-1 Master Power 
Switch 
Physical and 
Environmental 
A master power switch or emergency cut-off 
switch to IT equipment is present. It is located 
near the main entrance of the IT area and it is 
labeled and protected by a cover to prevent 
accidental shut-off. 
PEPF-1 Physical 
Protection of 
Facilities 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Every physical access point to facilities housing 
workstations that process or display sensitive 
information or unclassified information that has not 
been cleared for release is controlled during 
working hours and guarded or locked during non-
work hours. 
PEPF-2 Physical 
Protection of 
Facilities 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Every physical access point to facilities housing 
workstations that process or display classified 
information is guarded or alarmed 24 X 7. 
Intrusion alarms are monitored.  Two (2) forms of 
identification are required to gain access to the 
facility (e.g., ID badge, key card, cipher PIN, 
biometrics). A visitor log is maintained. 
PEPS-1 Physical 
Security Testing 
Physical and 
Environmental 
A facility penetration testing process is in place 
that includes periodic, unannounced attempts to 
penetrate key computing facilities. 
PESL-1 Screen Lock Physical and 
Environmental 
Unless there is an overriding technical or 
operational problem, workstation screen-lock 
functionality is associated with each workstation. 
When activated, the screen-lock function places 
an unclassified pattern onto the entire screen of 
the workstation, totally hiding what was previously 
visible on the screen. Such a capability is enabled 
either by explicit user action or a specified period 
of workstation inactivity (e.g., 15 minutes). Once 
the workstation screen-lock software is activated, 
access to the workstation requires knowledge of a 
unique authenticator. A screen lock function is not 
considered a substitute for logging out (unless a 
mechanism actually logs out the user when the 
user idle time is exceeded). 
PESP-1 Workplace 
Security 
Procedures 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Procedures are implemented to ensure the proper 
handling and storage of information, such as end-
of-day security checks, unannounced security 
checks, and, where appropriate, the imposition of 
a two-person rule within the computing facility. 
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PESS-1 Storage Physical and 
Environmental 
Documents and equipment are stored in approved 
containers or facilities with maintenance and 
accountability procedures that comply with DoD 
5200.1-R. 
PETC-1 Temperature 
Controls 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Temperature controls are installed that provide an 
alarm when temperature fluctuations potentially 
harmful to personnel or equipment operation are 
detected; adjustments to heating or cooling 
systems may be made manually. 
PETC-2 Temperature 
Controls 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Automatic temperature controls are installed to 
prevent temperature fluctuations potentially 
harmful to personnel or equipment operation. 
PETN-1 Environmental 
Control Training 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Employees receive initial and periodic training in 
the operation of environmental controls. 
PEVC-1 Visitor Control 
to Computing 
Facilities 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Current signed procedures exist for controlling 
visitor access and maintaining a detailed log of all 
visitors to the computing facility. 
PEVR-1 Voltage 
Regulators 
Physical and 
Environmental 
Automatic voltage control is implemented for key 
IT assets. 
PRAS-1 Access to 
Information 
Personnel Individuals requiring access to sensitive 
information are processed for access authorization 
in accordance with DoD personnel security 
policies. 
  
PRAS-2 Access to 
Information 
Personnel Individuals requiring access to classified 
information are processed for access authorization 
in accordance with DoD personnel security 
policies. 
PRMP-1 Maintenance 
Personnel 
Personnel Maintenance is performed only by authorized 
personnel. The process for determining 
authorization and the list of authorized 
maintenance personnel is documented. 
PRMP-2 Maintenance 
Personnel 
Personnel Maintenance is performed only by authorized 
personnel. The process for determining 
authorization and the list of authorized 
maintenance personnel is documented. Except as 
authorized by the DAA, personnel who perform 
maintenance on classified DoD information 
systems are cleared to the highest level of 
information on the system. Cleared personnel who 
perform maintenance on a classified DoD 
information system require an escort unless they 
have authorized access to the computing facility 
and the DoD information system. If uncleared or 
lower-cleared personnel are employed, a fully 
cleared and technically qualified escort monitors 
and records all activities in a maintenance log. 
The level of detail required in the maintenance log 
is determined by the IAM. All maintenance 
personnel comply with DAA requirements for U.S. 
citizenship, which are explicit for all classified 
systems. 
PRNK-1 Access to Need-
to-Know 
Information 
Personnel Only individuals who have a valid need-to-know 
that is demonstrated by assigned official 
Government duties and who satisfy all personnel 
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security criteria (e.g., IT position sensitivity 
background investigation requirements outlined in 
DoD 5200.2-R) are granted access to information 
with special protection measures or restricted 
distribution as established by the information 
owner. 
PRRB-1 Security Rules 
of Behavior or 
Acceptable Use 
Policy 
Personnel A set of rules that describe the IA operations of 
the DoD information system and clearly delineate 
IA responsibilities and expected behavior of all 
personnel is in place. The rules include the 
consequences of inconsistent behavior or non-
compliance. Signed acknowledgement of the rules 
is a condition of access. 
PRTN-1 Information 
Assurance 
Training 
Personnel A program is implemented to ensure that upon 
arrival and periodically thereafter, all personnel 
receive training and familiarization to perform their 
assigned IA responsibilities, to include 
familiarization with their prescribed roles in all IA- 
related plans such as incident response, 
configuration management and COOP or disaster 
recovery. 
VIIR-1 Incident 
Response 
Planning 
Vulnerability 
and Incident 
Management 
An incident response plan exists that identifies the 
responsible CND Service Provider in accordance 
with DoD Instruction O-8530.2 and CJCS 
Instruction 6510.01D, defines reportable incidents, 
outlines a standard operating procedure for 
incident response to include INFOCON, provides 
for user training, and establishes an incident 
response team. The plan is exercised at least 
annually. 
VIIR-2 Incident 
Response 
Planning 
Vulnerability 
and Incident 
Management 
An incident response plan exists that identifies the 
responsible CND Service Provider in accordance 
with DoD Instruction O-8530.2 and CJCS 
Instruction 6510.01D, defines reportable incidents, 
outlines a standard operating procedure for 
incident response to include INFOCON, provides 
for user training, and establishes an incident 
response team. The plan is exercised at least 
every 6 months. 
VIVM-1 Vulnerability 
Management 
Vulnerability 
and Incident 
Management 
A comprehensive vulnerability management 
process that includes the systematic identification 
and mitigation of software and hardware 
vulnerabilities is in place. Wherever system 
capabilities permit, mitigation is independently 
validated through inspection and automated 
vulnerability assessment or state management 
tools.  Vulnerability assessment tools have been 
acquired, personnel have been appropriately 
trained, procedures have been developed, and 
regular internal and external assessments are 
conducted. For improved interoperability, 
preference is given to tools that express 
vulnerabilities in the Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures (CVE) naming convention and use the 
Open Vulnerability Assessment Language (OVAL) 
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to test for the presence of vulnerabilities. 
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Appendix F:  IA Control Correlation  
Correlation Code 8 
 
Strength Correlation 
  8. NIST requirement and DoD IA control are equivalent.     
  NIST DoD IA Controls R Rank 
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)? 
6.1.3 System and Services Acquisition DCAS-1 Acquisition Standards   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection COPS-1 Power Supply   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PECF-1 Access to Computing Facilities   
6.2.2.1 Control Center/Control Room COAS-2 Alternate Site Designation   
6.2.2.1 Control Center/Control Room PECF-1 Access to Computing Facilities   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning COAS-1 Alternate Site Designation   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning COBR-1 Protection of Backup and Restoration Assets   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning CODB-1 Data Backup Procedures   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning COBR-1 Protection of Backup and Restoration Assets   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning CODB-1 Data Backup Procedures   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCII-1 IA Impact Assessment   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCIT-1 IA for IT Services   
6.2.6.1 Malicious Code Detection ECVP-1 Virus Protection   
6.2.6.3 Patch Management DCCT-1 Compliance Testing   
6.2.8 Incident Response PRTN-1 Information Assurance Training   
6.2.9 Awareness and Training PETN-1 Environmental Control Training   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECRG-1 Audit Reduction and Report Generation   
6.3.4.1 Encryption DCNR-1 Non-repudiation   
6.3.4.1 Encryption IAKM-3 Key Management   
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Correlation Code 9 
 
Strength Correlation 
9. NIST requirement is more specific than the DoD IA control.   
NIST DoD IA Controls R Rank 
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)? 
6.2.3.4 Dial-Up Modems EBRP-1 Remote Access for Privileged Functions   
6.3.1.1 Password Authentication IAIA-1 Individual Identification and Authentication   
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Correlation Code 17 
Strength Correlation 
17. NIST requirement is less specific than the DoD IA control.       
NIST DoD IA Controls 
 
Rank 
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)? 
6.1.1 Risk Assessment VIVM-1 Vulnerability Management   
6.1.2 Planning DCSD-1 IA Documentation   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PRAS-1 Access to Information   
6.2.1 Personnel Security PRNK-1 Access to Need-to-Know Information   
6.2.1 Personnel Security COPS-1 Power Supply   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection ECND-1 Network Device Controls   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PECF-2 Access to Computing Facilities   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PEHC-1 Humidity Controls   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PEMS-1 Master Power Switch   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PEPF-1 Physical Protection of Facilities   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PESS-1 Storage   
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection PETC-1 Temperature Controls   
6.2.2.1 Control Center/Control Room PECF-2 Access to Computing Facilities   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning CODP-1 Disaster and Recovery Planning   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning COEB-1 Enclave Boundary Defense   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning COED-1 Scheduled Exercises and Drills   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning COEF-1 Identification of Essential Functions   
6.2.3 Contingency Planning COTR-1 Trusted Recovery   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning CODP-1 Disaster and Recovery Planning   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning COEB-1 Enclave Boundary Defense   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning COED-1 Scheduled Exercises and Drills   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning COEF-1 Identification of Essential Functions   
6.2.3.2 Disaster Recovery Planning COMS-1 Maintenance Support   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCCB-1 Control Board   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCFA-1 Functional Architecture for AIS Applications   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCPD-1 Public Domain Software Controls   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCPR-1 CM Process   
6.2.4 Configuration Management DCSQ-1 Software Quality   
6.2.4 Configuration Management ECSD-1 Software Development Change Controls   
6.2.6 System and Information Integrity DCPA-1 Partitioning the Application   
6.2.6 System and Information Integrity DCSD-1 IA Documentation   
6.2.6.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention EBBD-1 Boundary Defense   
6.2.6.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention EBVC-1 VPN Controls   
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6.2.6.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention ECID-1 Host Based IDS   
6.2.7 Media Protection ECML-1 Marking and Labeling   
6.2.7 Media Protection PECS-1 Clearing and Sanitizing   
6.2.7 Media Protection PEDD-1 Destruction   
6.2.7 Media Protection PEDI-1 Data Interception   
6.2.7 Media Protection PESP-1 Workplace Security Procedures   
6.2.7 Media Protection PESS-1 Storage   
6.2.8 Incident Response VIIR-1 Incident Response Planning   
6.2.8 Incident Response VIVM-1 Vulnerability Management   
6.3.1.3 Physical Token Authentication IATS-1 Token and Certificate Standards   
6.3.2.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) ECAN-1 Access for Need-to-Know   
6.3.2.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) ECPA-1 Privileged Account Control   
6.3.2.2 Web Servers ECLP-1 Least Privilege   
6.3.2.3 Virtual Local Area Network (Vlan) DCPA-1 Partitioning the Application   
6.3.2.4 Dial-Up Modems EBRU-1 Remote Access for User Functions   
6.3.2.5 Wireless DCCS-1 Configuration Specifications   
6.3.2.5 Wireless ECWN-1 Wireless Computing and Network   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECAR-1 Audit Record Content – Public Systems   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECAT-1 Audit Trail, Monitoring, Analysis and Reporting   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECCD-1 Changes to Data   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECMT-1 Conformance Monitoring and Testing   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECTB-1 Audit Trail Backup   
6.3.3 Audit and Accountability ECTP-1 Audit Trail Protection   
6.3.4.1 Encryption DCSR-1 Specified Robustness - Basic   
6.3.4.1 Encryption ECCR-1 Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Rest)   
6.3.4.1 Encryption ECCT-1 Encryption for Confidentiality (Data at Transmit)   
6.3.4.1 Encryption ECNK-1 Encryption for Need-To-Know   
6.3.4.1 Encryption IAKM-1 Key Management   
6.3.4.2 Virtual Private Network DCSR-1 Specified Robustness - Basic   
6.3.4.2 Virtual Private Network EBRP-1 Remote Access for Privileged Functions   
6.3.4.2 Virtual Private Network EBRU-1 Remote Access for User Functions   
6.3.4.2 Virtual Private Network EBVC-1 VPN Controls   
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Correlation Code 11 
 
Strength Correlation 
  11. NIST requirement has no counterpart in the DoD IA control.       
  NIST DoD IA Controls R Rank 
Which security controls have the greatest impact on the security of ICS/SCADA systems (rank order- # 1 is the most important)? 
6.2.2 Physical and Environmental Protection ~PETS Toxic Substance Controls   
6.2.2.1 Control Center/Control Room ~PEBP Blast Protection   
6.2.2.2 Portable Devices ~PEAD Access Control to IT Devices   
6.2.2.3 Cabling ~PETP Physical Protection of Transmition Medium   
6.3.2.3 Virtual Local Area Network (Vlan) `DCVP Virtual Partitioning   
6.3.2.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) ECLP Enclave Computing Environment   
6.3.2.2 Web Servers EBRP Enclave Boundary Defense   
  6.3.2.4 Dial-Up Modem EBRP Enclave Boundary Defense   
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Appendix G: Survey Approval Letter 
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Appendix H: Survey Instrument 
Proposed Information Assurance controls for DoD Industrial 
Control Systems 
 
Primary Investigators: Lt Col J.W. Humphries and Mr. J. Lopez Jr. 
Student Researcher: Capt E.A. Mendezllovet 
Research Sponsor: HQ USAF A4/7 and AFCESA 
Purpose: To seek USAF Civil Engineering SME consensus for proposed Information 
Assurance controls to address security concerns specific to DoD Industrial Control 
Systems 
Background: The current DoD Information Assurance (IA) controls were last published 
in 2003 and do not adequately address cyber security aspects unique to Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS) or Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  This 
research effort combines recommended best practices from a variety of sources to derive 
a specific set of IA controls that can be incorporated into the DoD IA control framework. 
Many ICS or SCADA IA controls map to the DoD framework with no translation 
required. However, other IA controls were so specific to ICS or SCADA that some 
interpretation or translation is required. This survey contains the set of ICS or SCADA IA 
controls: 
That require translation to fit into an “existing” DoD IA control subject category 
That require interpretation to fit into a “newly created” DoD IA control subject 
category 
The rest of this survey is organized into three parts: (1) Demographics, (2) Ranking of 
ICS IA control category areas, and (3) Likert scale measurement of proposed new IA 
controls subject categories. Instructions are provided for part II and III of the survey. 
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PART I - Demographics: 
 
1. What Major Command are you affiliated with (select only one)? 
a. ACC 
b. AETC 
c. AFGSC 
d. AFMC 
e. AFRC 
f. AFSPC 
g. AFSOC 
h. AMC 
i. PACAF 
j. USAFE 
k. Other: _____________ 
2. How many years of experience in Control Systems do you have? 
a. Less than one year 
b. 1-3 years 
c. 4-7 years 
d. 8-11 years 
e. Twelve or more years  
 
3. What computer security or network security training have you completed, list all that 
apply? 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
4. What certifications have you successfully completed (e.g. Security+), list all that 
apply? 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________ 
5. What is your affiliation with the government (Select all that apply)? 
a. Contractor 
b. Military (Reserve, Guard, or Active Duty) 
c. Civil Service employee 
d. Other (Describe) _______________________________ 
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PART II - Rankings: 
Instructions: Rank the following ICS security controls in order of importance for the day-
to-day operations of USAF control systems. The rankings are grouped by control 
category area (i.e. three separate grouped rankings). Place importance on the graveness of 
the impact if the service becomes disrupted or unavailable. Start with “one” being the 
most important. Note: Email attachment contains control definitions 
 
Control Area Category (Rankings:  1 - 4) Rank 
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 Risk Assessment (Page 6-2) 
 
Planning ((Page 6-3) 
 
System and Service Acquisition (Page 6-4) 
 
Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments (Page 6-5) 
 
Control Area Category (Rankings:  1 - 15) Rank 
O
p
er
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Personnel Security (Page 6-7) 
 
Physical & Environmental Protection, (Page 6-7) 
 
Control Center/Control Room (Page 6-10) 
 
Portable Devices (Page 6-10) 
 
Cabling (Page 6-10) 
 
Contingency Planning (Page 6-11) 
 
Disaster Recovery Planning  (Page 6-12) 
 
Configuration Management (Page 6-13) 
 
System and Information Integrity (Page 6-14) 
 
Malicious Code Detection (Page 6-15) 
 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention (Page 6-15) 
 
Patch Management (Page 6-16) 
 
Media Protection (Page 6-18) 
 
Incident Response (Page 6-18) 
 
Awareness and Training (Page 6-21) 
 
Control Area Category (Rankings:  1 - 11) Rank 
T
ec
h
n
ic
a
l 
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
 
Identification and Authentication (Page 6-22) 
 
Password Authentication (Page 6-23) 
 
Physical Token Authentication (Page 6-25) 
 
Role-Based Access Control (Page 6-27)  
 
Web Servers (Page 6-28) 
 
Virtual Local Area Network (Page 6-28) 
 
Dial-up Modems (Page 6-29) 
 
Wireless (Page 6-30) 
 
Audit and Accountability (Page 6-31) 
 
Encryption (Page 6-33) 
 
Virtual Private Network (VPN) (Page 6-34) 
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PART III – Agreement Measurements:  
Part A: 
Instructions: This part contains three ICS IA controls that are not specifically addressed in the DoD IA control framework. 
Given their relevance and importance in a control systems environment, do you agree that the ICS security topic in column B 
should be incorporated to the DoD IA control in column A?  Using a 5-point scale, indicate your level of agreement with 
incorporating ICS security control to the DoD IA control.  For example, marking 5 indicates that you strongly agree that 
RBAC in column B fits under ECLP from column A and the verbiage should be added to the definition of the DoD IA control.  
Marking 1 would indicate that you strongly disagree that RBAC fits into ECLP; therefore it should not be incorporated. 
A.  DoD IA Control:  ECLP 
Enclave Computing Environment (EC) 
S
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n
ly
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e 
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n
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A
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B.  ICS IA 
Access Control 
Least Privilege (LP): Access procedures enforce the 
principles of separation of duties and "least privilege." 
 Access to privileged accounts is limited to privileged 
users. Use of privileged accounts is limited to 
privileged functions; that is, privileged users use non-
privileged accounts for all non-privileged functions. 
This control is in addition to an appropriate security 
clearance and need-to-know authorization 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.3.2.1. Role Based Access Control (RBAC): 
RBAC can be used to provide a uniform means to manage access to 
ICS devices while reducing the cost of maintaining individual device 
access levels and minimizing errors. RBAC should be used to restrict 
ICS user privileges to only those that are required to perform each 
person’s job (i.e., configuring each role based on the principle of least 
privilege). 
 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-1 
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A.  DoD IA Control:  EBRP 
 
Enclave Boundary Defense (EB) 
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B.  ICS IA 
 
Access Control 
Remote Access for Privilege Functions (RP):  
Remote access for privileged functions is discouraged, is 
permitted only for compelling operational needs, and is 
strictly controlled. In addition to EBRU-1, sessions 
employ security measures such as a VPN with blocking 
mode enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote 
session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the log 
for every remote session. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.3.2.4. Dial-up Modem.   
- Consider using callback systems when dial-up modems are installed 
in an ICS. This ensures that a dialer is an authorized user by having the 
modem establish the working connection based on the dialer’s 
information from a callback number stored in the ICS approved 
authorized user list.  
- Ensure that default passwords have been changed and strong 
passwords are in place for each modem. 
- Physically identify modems in use to the control room operators.  
- Configure remote control software to use unique user names and 
passwords, strong authentication, encryption if determined appropriate, 
and audit logs. Use of this software by remote users should be 
monitored on an almost real-time frequency.  
- If feasible, disconnect modems when not in use or consider 
automating this disconnection process by having modems disconnect 
after being on for a given amount of time. It should be noted that 
sometimes modem connections are part of the legal support service 
agreement with the vendor (e.g., 24x7 support with 15 minute response 
time). Personnel should be aware that disconnecting/removing the 
modems may require that contracts be renegotiated. 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-2 
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A.  DoD IA Control:  EBRP 
Enclave Boundary Defense (EB) 
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B.  ICS IA 
 
Access Control 
Remote Access for Privilege Functions (RP): 
Remote access for privileged functions is discouraged, is 
permitted only for compelling operational needs, and is 
strictly controlled. In addition to EBRU-1, sessions 
employ security measures such as a VPN with blocking 
mode enabled. A complete audit trail of each remote 
session is recorded, and the IAM/IAO reviews the log 
for every remote session. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6.3.2.2. Web Servers.  
SCADA and historian software vendors typically provide 
Web servers as a product option so that users outside the 
control room can access ICS information. In many cases, 
software components such as ActiveX controls or Java 
applets must be installed or downloaded onto each client 
machine accessing the Web server. Some products, such as 
PLCs and other control devices, are available with 
embedded Web, FTP, and e-mail servers to make them 
easier to configure remotely and allow them to generate e-
mail notifications and reports when certain conditions 
occur. When feasible, use HTTPS rather than HTTP, use 
SFTP or SCP rather than FTP, block inbound FTP and e-
mail traffic, etc. 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-3 
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Part B 
Instructions: This part contains five ICS IA that didn’t translate into an existing DoD IA control; additional interpretation is required in order to 
recommend a “new subcategory area” that will adequately address the ICS security concern.  Do you agree that the ICS security topic in column B 
should fit under newly created DoD IA control in column A?  Using a 5-point scale, indicate your level of agreement with creating new DoD IA control 
to encompass ICS security topic from column B. For example, marking 5 indicates that you strongly agree that Environmental Control Systems in 
column B fits under PETS from column A.  Marking 1 would indicate that you strongly disagree Environmental Control Systems fits into PETS; 
therefore it should not be incorporated. 
 
A.   DoD IA Control:  PETS  
 
Physical and Environment (PE) 
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B.  ICS IA 
 
Physical and Environmental Protection 
[New DoD Subcategory]  
 
 
Toxic Substance Controls (TS):   
 
 
 
No current definition available///  
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Environmental Control Systems. 
Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems for control 
rooms must support plant personnel during normal operation and 
emergency situations, which could include the release of toxic 
substances. Fire systems must be carefully designed to avoid causing 
more harm than good (e.g., to avoid mixing water with incompatible 
products). HVAC and fire systems have significantly increased roles in 
security that arise from the interdependence of process control and 
security. For example, fire prevention and HVAC systems that support 
industrial control computers need to be protected against cyber 
incidents. 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-4 
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A.   DoD IA Control:  PEBP 
 
Physical and Environment (PE) 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
D
is
a
g
re
e
 
N
eu
tr
a
l 
A
g
re
e 
S
tr
o
n
g
ly
 
A
g
re
e
 
B.  ICS IA 
 
 
Physical and Environmental Protection 
[New DoD Subcategory]  
 
Blast Protection Controls (BP): 
 
 
///No current definition available/// 
 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 
Control Center/Control Room.    
Providing physical security for the control center/control room is 
essential to reduce the potential of many threats. In extreme cases, it 
may be considered necessary to make the control center/control room 
blast-proof, or to provide an offsite emergency control center/control 
room so that control can be maintained if the primary control 
center/control room becomes uninhabitable. 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
119 
 
 
 
A.   DoD IA Control:  PEAD 
 
Physical and Environment (PE) S
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B.  ICS IA 
 
Physical and Environmental Protection 
[New DoD Subcategory]  
 
 
Access Controls to ICS Devices (AD):   
 
 
///No current definition available/// 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Portable Devices.   
Computers and computerized devices used for ICS functions (such as 
PLC programming) should never be allowed to leave the ICS area. 
Laptops, portable engineering workstations and handhelds (e.g., 375 
HART communicator) should be tightly secured and should never be 
allowed to be used outside the ICS network. Antivirus and patch 
management should be kept current. 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-6 
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A.   DoD IA Control:  PETP 
Physical and Environment (PE) 
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B.  ICS IA 
 
Physical and Environmental Protection 
[New DoD Subcategory]  
 
 
Transmission Medium Protection (TP):   
 
 
 
///No current definition available/// 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Cabling.   
Cabling design and implementation for the control network should be 
addressed in the cyber security plan. Unshielded twisted pair 
communications cable, while acceptable for the office environment, is 
generally not suitable for the plant environment due to its susceptibility 
to interference from magnetic fields, radio waves, temperature 
extremes, moisture, dust, and vibration. Industrial RJ-45 connectors 
should be used in place of other types of twisted pair connectors to 
provide protection against moisture, dust and vibration. Fiber-optic 
cable and coaxial cable are often better network cabling choices for the 
control network because they are immune to many of the typical 
environmental conditions including electrical and radio frequency 
interference found in an industrial control environment. Cable and 
connectors should be color-coded and labeled so that the ICS and IT 
networks are clearly delineated and the potential for an inadvertent 
cross-connect is reduced. Cable runs should be installed so that access 
is minimized (i.e., limited to authorized personnel only) and equipment 
should be installed in locked cabinets with adequate ventilation and air 
filtration. 
 
Additional Comments: 
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A.   DoD IA Control:  DCVP 
 
Security Design and Configuration (DC) 
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B.  ICS IA 
 
Access Control 
[New DoD Subcategory]  
 
 
Virtual Partitioning (VP):  
 
///No current definition available/// 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Virtual LAN (VLAN). 
VLANs have been effectively deployed in ICS networks, with 
each automation cell assigned to a single VLAN to limit 
unnecessary traffic flooding and allow network devices on the 
same VLAN to span multiple switches. 
Additional Comments: 
 
 
Q-8 
Thank you for your participation in this Delphi study. I you need assistance completing the survey responses you can 
contact Capt Mendezllovet at (813)335-9034 or Mr. Lopez at (937)255-6565 at extension 4637. Please submit your completed 
responses via email to eddie.mendezllovet@afit.edu located at the Air Force Institute of Technology in Wright Patterson AFB, 
Ohio. 
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Appendix I:  AFIT IRB Approval 
 
March 1, 2010  
 
Lt Col Humphries, 
 
I have reviewed your study entitled “Information Assurance Controls for DoD Industrial Control Systems” 
and found that your study qualifies for an IRB exemption. 
 
Per 32 CFR 219.101 (b)(2), Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, 
aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, 
unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, 
directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects’ 
responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or 
be damaging to the subjects’ financial standing, employability, or reputation is exempt. 
 
Your study qualifies for this exemption because the demographic data you are collecting cannot 
realistically be expected to map a given response to a specific subject, and the questions you are asking 
could not reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ 
financial standing, employability, or reputation.  Finally, while you are collecting names, this is a required 
and natural consequence of your selected data collection methodology.  These names will be protected at 
all times, only be known to the researchers, and managed according to the AFIT interview protocol. 
 
This determination pertains only to the Federal, DoD, and Air Force regulations that govern the use of 
human subjects in research.  It does not constitute final approval to conduct the study which should be 
granted by you research advisor.  Further, if a subject’s future response reasonably places them at risk of 
criminal or civil liability or is damaging to their financial standing, employability, or reputation, you are 
required to file an adverse event report with this office immediately.  
 
WILLIAM A. CUNNINGHAM, PhD 
AFIT IRB Research Reviewer 
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